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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CARIBBEAN DEFENSE COMMAND 
(1941-1947) 
by 
Cesar A. Vasquez 
Florida International University, 2016 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Kenneth Lipartito, Major Professor 
The United States Military is currently organized along the lines of regional 
combatant commands (COCOMs).  Each COCOM is responsible for all U.S. military 
activity in their designated area of responsibility (AOR).  They also deal with diplomatic 
issues of a wide variety with the countries within their respective AORs.  Among these 
COCOMs, Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), whose AOR encompasses all of Central 
and South America (less Mexico) and the Caribbean, is one of the smallest in terms of 
size and budget, but has the longest history of activity among the COCOMs as it is the 
successor to the first joint command, the United States Caribbean Defense Command 
(CDC 1941-1947).  
Existing from 1941 to 1947, the CDC was tasked with protecting the Panama 
Canal, the Canal Zone, and all its access points as well as defending the region from Axis 
aggression and setting up a series of U.S. bases throughout the Caribbean from which to 
project U.S. military power after World War II.  Throughout its short history, however, 
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the CDC was plagued with the same types of resource scarcity that its successor 
commands would later experience.  Early successes, as well as the progress of the war 
saw to it that the original mission of the Command was quickly rendered moot.  
Ironically, it was partially the success of the U.S. war effort that kept the CDC from ever 
reaching its full potential.  Nevertheless, the CDC evolved into something different than 
had originally been envisioned.  In the end, it became the model that other COCOMs 
would follow after November 1947 when the system of regional combatant commands 
was formally established.  Although some research has been conducted into the history of 
these commands, this dissertation is the first academic attempt to chronicle the history of 
the United States Caribbean Defense Command. 
Research into this topic involved combing through the Archives of the United 
States Southern Command in its offices in Miami, Florida (SOUTHCOM Archives), as 
well as the CDC archives in Record Group 548 in the U.S. National Archives II in 
Suitland, Maryland.  Secondary sources as well as references regarding treaties and 
international agreements were also consulted as necessary. 
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PREFACE 
 
In late 2009, I accepted a position as a contracted historian at U.S. Southern 
Command under Command Historian Dr. Bradley Coleman.  Having never had the 
opportunity to serve, this was my first real exposure to the military so to say it took some 
getting used to would be an understatement.  As I grew more comfortable in my position 
and learned more about the functions of Southern Command, I began to understand the 
important role this command, as well as other regional combatant commands, plays in the 
U.S. military.  The position also allowed me to finish my coursework, and when it came 
time to begin preparing for comprehensive exams and dissertation work, I found that my 
interests had shifted from southern history more toward U.S. relations with Latin 
America in line with the work I was doing at Southern Command. 
While there, I became familiarized with both the history of the Command and its 
predecessors and with Record Group 548 of the U.S. National Archives which contains 
the bulk of the records of the Caribbean Defense Command.  The relatively untapped 
wealth of knowledge contained in this record group would be enough to fill countless 
volumes, and I cannot possibly do it justice in a single dissertation.  Nevertheless, the 
story of the Caribbean Defense Command is one that has been neglected for too long.  
The history of how the CDC became the prototype that later regional combatant 
commands would follow is one that deserves to be told as it was the first time a joint 
command of this nature had been attempted and had far reaching consequences in the 
way the U.S. military operates to this day.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The phrase “military efficiency” is normally understood to mean the ability to do 
something both quickly and with maximum effect in view of resources being utilized.  
Whether or not an unbiased observer of the United States’ military would actually label 
its work as being done with “military efficiency” is up for debate.  Like any human 
institution, the U.S. military is subject to its own flaws, foibles, and phases, and it has not 
always (or possibly ever) functioned or operated with what one would term “military 
efficiency.”  Inter-service competition has always played a large part of the relationship 
between the services and this has not always been limited to simply the annual 
Army/Navy football game, but has also included competition among high-ranking 
officers over the allocation of limited resources.   
Current United States military doctrine espouses the use of overwhelming force 
on an enemy, as well as the ability to conduct two major theater wars simultaneously, 
tasks that clearly call for military efficiency.1  However, the logistics of accomplishing 
these tasks are easy to overlook.  For one, the United States military is not a singular unit.  
It consists of five different branches, all with their own different purposes, personalities, 
traditions, practices, and histories.  The five branches of the U.S. military are the U.S. 
Army, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Air Force, and U.S. Coast Guard.  Each of 
these is responsible for differing aspects of military activities.  Confusingly, however, 
several of these responsibilities overlap.  The U.S. Marine Corps, for instance, though 
                                                          
1.  U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Sept.30, 2001 (Washington DC: 
Dept. of Defense, 2001), 18, http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS18834. 
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normally considered its own independent branch of the service, still administratively 
operates in some respects as a part of the U.S. Navy.  Though the U.S. Air Force is 
normally thought of as composing the United States’ air power, the U.S. Navy, Marine 
Corps, Army, and Coast Guard all have pilots and ample aviation assets.  Many of the 
best fighter pilots in the military are in fact Navy pilots based on aircraft carriers.  
Moreover, while the term “sailor” conjures the image of ship-based personnel, the U.S. 
Navy seals, such as those involved in the 2011 raid that killed Osama Bin Laden, were 
Navy personnel, meaning they could technically be called “sailors.” 
Further confusing matters is that although every service has its own Chief of Staff 
and administration, the administration of the U.S. military as a whole is currently 
separated into several regionally based combatant commands.  People are used to hearing 
the term “Central Command,” “Northern Command,” or “European Command,” but few 
actually understand the meaning of these terms, nor could they conceive of the structures 
these commands encompass without having it described to them in detail.  Each of these 
regional combatant commands oversees all military assets assigned to a particular region 
of the world.  For instance, Army and Marine units serving in Europe are under the 
command of United States European Command, headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany.  
All military units assigned to the Middle East report to United States Central Command 
in Tampa, Florida.  Defense of the continental United States is handled by forces under 
U.S. Northern Command, headquartered in Colorado Springs, Colorado, while all 
military units assigned to Central America (less Mexico), South America, and the 
Caribbean report to United States Southern Command headquartered in Miami, Florida.  
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Although many are familiar with the concept of an army base, the headquarters of 
these combatant commands operate under a different concept altogether.  Combatant 
command headquarters normally house personnel of all five military groups.  Their staff 
consists of a mixture of personnel from all branches of the military, many with different 
training and procedures.  Since the 2000s when the separate branches of the service 
began differentiating their combat fatigues from the standard woodland camouflage battle 
dress uniform that had been used since the 1980s, it has also meant that Combatant 
Commands have included service members wearing uniforms with a plethora of differing 
colors and camouflage patterns, along with any civilians that may be employed there, and 
even partner nation military personnel assigned to liaison duty.  These are truly unique 
headquarters. 
Aside from the superficial, the structure of the work these commands do is also 
unique.  They are not tasked with any singular military mission, such as defending a 
position or engaging an enemy.  The work they do encompasses what is presently termed 
a “whole of government approach.”  That is, these commands are at the forefront of 
bringing all the resources of the U.S. government, not simply its military, to bear on their 
mission.  In practice, this means that these combatant commands include elements of the 
U.S. Department of State, as well as other agencies ranging in scope from the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID).  This allows them to oversee activities as varied as disaster 
relief, school construction, assisting partner nations with water reclamation, and aiding 
U.S. embassies in the region in cases of political turmoil.  In the case of United States 
Southern Command, the Military Deputy Commander, the second highest ranking 
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military officer, has a civilian counterpart.  This counterpart is called the Civilian Deputy 
to the Commander (for reasons of military discipline, namely that as a civilian he cannot 
issue military orders he cannot be called a deputy commander).  This Civilian Deputy 
also serves as the senior foreign policy advisor to the Commander, and often represents 
the Command abroad.  This position is an ambassadorial level assignment in the United 
States Foreign Service, and is often filled by ambassadors coming from a previous 
assignment in the Southern Command AOR. 
Structurally, all combatant commands have different missions based on the nature 
of the region they are assigned to, thus U.S. Central Command spent the beginning of the 
twenty-first century heavily involved in war fighting in the Middle East and commanded 
a much greater part of the military budget than it had the previous century.  U.S. 
European Command had largely been at the forefront of the Cold War until its end in 
1991, at which point the Command had to deal with the splintering of the Soviet Union 
and increasing strife in former Soviet satellite countries.  U.S. Pacific Command is 
largely dependent on naval power and assets and covers a geographically larger area than 
any of the others, but is typically more likely to participate in humanitarian 
assistance/disaster relief activities than war fighting.  Africa Command which is the 
newest of the COCOMs is still rather small and is not physically located on the continent 
it serves, but still has to deal with a highly unstable region.  The instability of the African 
continent makes their work doubly difficult.   
The United States Southern Command meanwhile is tasked with running and 
maintaining United States military presence throughout an AOR which has been 
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generally peaceful for over a century.  Though there have been border skirmishes and 
small scale “wars” fought throughout the SOUTHCOM AOR, there have been no major 
invasions which would drastically alter the AOR’s map.  It is surprising then that U.S. 
Southern Command can trace its existence back farther than any of the other regional 
combatant commands of the U.S. military establishment.  U.S. Southern Command came 
into existence in 1963.  For most of its existence (as of this writing) it was headquartered 
in Quarry Heights, Panama Canal Zone and only moved to its current location of Miami, 
Florida in 1997 in anticipation of the handover of the Panama Canal and Canal Zone back 
to Panama at the end of 1999.   
From 1947 to 1963, SOUTHCOM’s predecessor was United States Caribbean 
Command.  Caribbean Command was initially tasked with responsibilities over the 
waterways and access points to the Panama Canal as well as all military forces 
throughout the region.  Due partly to interagency competition and partly to international 
politics, Caribbean Command’s AOR was steadily reduced until 1963 by which point it 
did not have any actual role in the Caribbean at all.  Thus, the re-organization and 
renaming from Caribbean Command to Southern Command was as much to avoid 
confusion as it was to deal with administrative and tactical issues. From 1941 to 1947, the 
predecessor to both of these was the United States Caribbean Defense Command (CDC).  
The CDC was a prototype combined command tasked with protecting the Panama Canal 
and its access points as well as dealing with possible Axis threats within the region.  Its 
existence was precipitated by World War II.  The need for such a combined combatant 
command was dictated by the presence of the Panama Canal and Canal Zone.   
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FIGURE 1: The Miraflores Locks under Construction in 1912. 
Source: Pictorial Archives of United States Southern Command, SOUTHCOM Archives. 
 
The Panama Canal is both a marvel of engineering and a great logistical challenge 
to operate.  It operates via a series of large locks which were carved into the surrounding 
isthmus via a long and arduous process (see Figure 1).  These locks are intricate 
mechanisms and vulnerable to mechanical issues and possible sabotage.  The Canal has 
been at times considered a military and a commercial asset.  It is immobile, making it 
inherently vulnerable to attack, and was and remains approachable via two oceans at a 
time when the United States was at war with two very aggressive nations both of which 
commanded ample naval assets.  The Canal Zone was an exclave of American personnel 
in a location that was both remote from the United States and not quickly reachable with 
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the technology of the time.  Moreover, governmental instability in the region always 
threatened to leave the Canal in close proximity to potentially hostile nations.   
Another part of the mission of the CDC was that of setting up a series of bases 
which would serve to project U.S. power in the region in the postwar period.  The fact 
that this never materialized led some to postulate that the CDC had at least partially failed 
in its mission, but such assessment does not take into consideration the reasons behind 
such failure.  The CDC was established in order to help forward the war effort, but the 
war never really came to the region.  Many of the larger fears that had been posited about 
German U-Boats, Japanese warships, Axis infiltrators, or fifth column saboteurs either 
never materialized or were dealt with quickly at the beginning of the war effort.   
As it turned out, the Caribbean Defense Command had less military significance 
during World War II than military leaders had originally thought it would.  Axis 
aggression against the region having been effectively dealt with early on after the U.S. 
entry into the war, meant that no major attacks against the Panama Canal or Canal Zone 
were ever successfully carried out.  Furthermore, the U.S. contingency plans for using 
and improving Panamanian railroads for moving supplies from the Atlantic to the Pacific 
in case of emergency were assessed to be sufficient to supplant the Canal altogether 
should the latter become completely inoperable.  Over ten thousand American military 
vessels eventually passed through the canal during World War II, but the railroads along 
the isthmus by themselves would have been sufficient to handle all the shipping just as 
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well as the Canal had, though at an admittedly higher price.  In retrospect, this rendered 
the Canal less of a strategic asset than a symbolic, diplomatic, and economic one. 2 
As the tide of war began to turn, the Caribbean Defense Command saw itself 
being increasingly marginalized militarily, with resources and personnel reduced.  By this 
time though, the CDC had begun to operate on other fronts such as diplomacy and 
training which saw increased success.  Indeed, the gains that the Caribbean Defense 
Command continued to achieve more than made up for the lack of action in the region.  
Inter-American military cooperation reached an all-time high, with almost every country 
in the region eventually declaring war against the Axis.  Military training and cooperation 
undertaken by the CDC increased the capabilities of allied militaries to defend 
themselves, lessening the need for direct U.S. intervention and acting as a force 
multiplier.   
As such, with the war winding down, the focus of the Caribbean Defense 
Command began to shift from the security and defense of the Panama Canal and the 
AOR from Axis aggression, to what could be more accurately called inter-American 
cooperation.  In November of 1944, the command began to establish additional training 
resources to assist the efforts of the American republics to “mold their individual military 
                                                          
2.  Noel Maurer and Carlos Yu, The Big Ditch: How America Took, Built, Ran, and Ultimately Gave Away 
the Panama Canal (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 125. 
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groups into well-functioning and efficient organizations patterned after the general 
principles of the United States Army.3” 
Finally, the end of the war left the command without its defining purpose, making 
it inevitable that it would have to adapt to fill a new role or cease to exist altogether.  
Although the Caribbean Defense Command only outlasted the war by two years, its 
greatest accomplishment could be said to have been that it survived the war at all.  The 
existence of the CDC proved that it was possible to run a regionally based joint 
combatant command outside of the territorial United States and have it contribute to a 
major war effort.  The activities of the Command toward the end of the war, moreover, 
shifted dramatically to the role of diplomacy which would prove to be far more necessary 
to a postwar world heading into the Cold War than would a series of Caribbean bases.  As 
such, the Caribbean Defense Command actually anticipated the roles that such COCOMs 
would play in the future.  
Additionally, the presence of the Caribbean Defense Command helped the United 
States in its dealings with its neighbors by providing a centralized authority within close 
proximity to the South American continent which could communicate quickly with 
decision makers in Washington D.C.  In the end, the Caribbean Defense Command 
evolved into more than it was originally intended to be, and set a precedent for how such 
combined combatant commands can operate and what they could accomplish.  Although 
it could be argued the initial goals of the Caribbean Defense Command were never fully 
                                                          
3.  Training Memorandum Number 1, Training Directive Training Year 1945.  Headquarters, Caribbean 
Defense Command, Office of the Commanding General, Nov. 1, 1944, Record Group 548, U.S National 
Archives II, Suitland, Maryland, Entry 5, Box 1 (hereafter cited as RG 548).  
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achieved, leading some to consider the Command a partial failure, the fact that the U.S. 
military is today divided among regional commands in the model first established by the 
Caribbean Defense Command suggests that if it was a failure, it was a very successful 
failure at worst. 
The following chapter will deal with the sources used in writing this dissertation 
as well as a review of pertinent literature that was consulted.  Subsequent chapters will 
follow in a generally chronological order.  Chapter one briefly provides some background 
information on U.S. relations with the region.  Chapter two discusses the years 
immediately leading to the creation of the CDC.  Chapter three documents the CDC’s 
first full year of existence and the rapid growth the Command experienced.  Chapter four 
examines 1943, the year which turned the tide in activity for the command and began the 
trend in downsizing that would continue for the rest of the command’s history.  Chapter 
five focuses on the last years of the command when downsizing caused a redefinition of 
the Command’s goals and missions in a world at the beginning of the Cold War.  The 
conclusion then explains why the history of the CDC is important to understanding both 
the progress of the Cold War in the region and in understanding the present organization 
of the U.S. military worldwide. 
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A NOTE ON SOURCES AND LITERATURE 
 
As for primary sources, a great deal of the documents cited here will be 
documents from the U.S. National Archives collections on the military in the region.  
Many of these were pulled from the existing collection of the United States Southern 
Command History Office which made an effort to retrieve these from the National 
Archives starting in 2008.  The use of these documents carries with it both certain 
benefits and some limitations.  For example, during the existence of Caribbean Defense 
Command, several reports were generated attempting to document the functions of the 
Command.  These reports were often titled as histories, although they were being written 
in real time during the existence of the command with no hindsight, and nothing in the 
way of literature review.  In reality these “histories” were more akin to after action 
administrative reports.  They were mostly written by uniformed personnel, and often 
contained ample references to internal military orders, but offer little if any analysis.  
Many of these can currently be found in the CDC archives in Record Group 548. 
Several of these reports, as well as other similarly located primary documents 
were used in the preparation of this dissertation.  Three of these in particular, the “Anti-
Submarine Activities in the CDC,” and the similarly titled “History of the Caribbean 
Defense Command,” and “History of the CDC,” were particularly useful early on in 
mapping out a rough outline for the first part of the narrative, though the fact that they 
were mostly written while the CDC was still in operation made them less useful in 
analyzing the subject.  Unsurprisingly, little or no attempt was made by the authors of 
these reports to place them in context of the academic writings of the time, as they were 
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intended for internal military audiences only.  For the most part, the personnel preparing 
these were interested in celebrating the work of the Command and that of the U.S. 
military and perhaps pointing out best practices to increase military efficiency.  These 
documents are, however, good points of insight into the military mentality and biases of 
the time.  One in particular, the “History of the CDC,” contained a section which 
betrayed a very cavalier attitude toward racial discrimination on the part of the author 
which will be analyzed later on.  Care has been taken to analyze these primary documents 
in an objective manner.  Wherever possible, the documents they cite have been retrieved 
and scrutinized for further clarity.   
Additionally, some internal U.S. Southern Command reports, a number of which 
were written by the author of this dissertation while a historian there, have also been used 
for reference.  Although internal SOUTHCOM documents sometimes contain secret 
information, no such report was used in preparing this dissertation.  All documents cited 
here are unclassified in nature and available via Freedom of Information Act requests 
from the U.S. Southern Command History or Public Affairs offices.  One of these 
documents, titled, “Crisis, Transformation and Renewal, Historical Review of the Tenure 
of General Douglas Fraser (USAF) As Commander, United States Southern Command, 
June 2009-November 2012,” contains secret sections which were not accessible to the 
author so all portions cited from this report contain only unclassified information.   
As for the historiography, much has been written on the history of the United 
States’ relation with what encompassed the CDC’s Area of Responsibility, though 
interestingly the works on U.S. relations with mainland South America have often been 
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separated from those on relations with the Caribbean.  Like any other subject, this 
relationship has undergone several phases which were influenced by both developments 
within the United States and internationally.  In particular, the drug trade and political 
factors have contributed to a noticeable shift in the way the history from the beginning of 
the twentieth century to the end of the Cold War has been approached.  Not surprisingly, 
early American historians used the opportunity of documenting this relationship to try to 
celebrate American exceptionalism in the first part of the century.  This was aided in 
particular by the United States’ successful construction of the Panama Canal even though 
the United States’ actions in creating the canal were probably among the most 
questionable actions it took toward the region and caused bad feelings which took 
decades to dissipate.  This particular episode is representative of several of policy shifts 
that characterized these relationships. 
Early academic attention to mainland South America was sparse at best.  Latin 
America as a whole had escaped the scrutiny by many American scholars that had been 
directed at Europe and to some degree Asia.  United States’ relations with Latin America 
as a whole were initially seen through a largely United States-centric point of view.  The 
most influential work defining this period was Henry Flag Bemis’ The Latin American 
Policy of the United States: An Historical Analysis (1943).4  Bemis’ primary goal seemed 
to be the celebration of American exceptionalism.  His analysis, which came to be called 
the “Western hemisphere idea,” was very much a product of its time and dealt heavily 
                                                          
4.  Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States (New York: Harcourt, Brace and 
Co., 1943). 
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with issues of security (it was written during World War II). Overall, the analysis was 
very accepting of enforced United States nationalism and rejoiced at solidarity against the 
axis threat that was being demonstrated by the United States and its Latin allies.  It 
praised the “Good Neighbor Policy” and saw “imperialism” as a false claim or where it 
did exist, as being largely benign at worst.   This analysis was later identified as the 
“liberal” approach by Abraham Lowenthal in his 1973 article, “United States Policy 
Toward Latin America: ‘Liberal,’ ‘Radical,’ and ‘Bureaucratic.’”  Regardless of the 
nomenclature however, the essential analysis saw relations between the United States and 
its southern neighbors as predicated on “an essential compatibility of interests” derived 
from a shared experience of republican rebellion.5 
Bemis argued that the Monroe Doctrine was mainly a defensive move born out of 
legitimate American fears of European powers returning to take away the newly gained 
independence of the Latin American republics—and then that of the United States itself.  
He treated the U.S. expansion following the doctrine of manifest density as benign saying 
that “There was no thought other than peaceful expansion.”  He further characterized 
Theodore Roosevelt’s policy of the “big stick” (the Roosevelt Corollary) as benevolent 
and “a bit of a necessity” at the time.  Tellingly, Bemis was particularly reluctant to use 
the term “imperialism” except to explain that it is what he was referring to when using his 
preferred term, “new manifest destiny.” He then went on to outline exactly why any 
                                                          
5.  Abraham F. Lowenthal, “United States Policy toward Latin America: Liberal, Radical, and Bureaucratic 
Perspectives,” Latin American Research Review 8 (Fall 1973): 3-25 
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expansive American attitude was justified in light of actual threats both to itself and its 
neighbors. 
Bemis’ positive, and some would say shallow analysis, was short lived.  The 1959 
Cuban Revolution increased United States governmental funding and scholarly attention 
to the region and opened up a new front in the Cold War.  For the first time, countries of 
the Western Hemisphere seemed at risk of becoming Soviet satellites, and the region’s 
rich and so far untapped history became an increasingly popular subject for graduate 
students and scholars.  The field quickly began to be filled with a differing analysis which 
saw Bemis’ pro-American views as naïve and downright cringe inducing in their 
simplicity.   The ensuing years saw a great deal of scholarship following what Abraham 
Lowenthal termed the “radical” approach, but which others have labeled as simply 
“revisionist.”6  The bulk of the scholarship during the Cold War ascribed to this analysis 
was predicated on the idea that the United States was committing economic imperialism 
toward Latin America as a whole and was pursuing its own Cold War goals rather than 
true partnerships with the region.  By the end of the Cold War, most historians had 
largely bought into the radical perspective.  It should be noted that the third perspective 
which Lowenthal identified; the “bureaucratic” perspective dealt with looking at United 
States decision making from a structural perspective of how policy was derived by 
different actors without looking deeply at the underwriting ideologies.  According to 
Mark T. Gilderhus in his article, “An Emerging Synthesis? US.-Latin American Relations 
since the Second World War,” this particular perspective has been popular among social 
                                                          
6.  Lowenthal, “United States Policy toward Latin America,” 3-25. 
17 
 
scientists, but has not generally appealed to historians, especially those espousing the 
radical perspective.7   
Key early scholars writing in the radical/revisionist school included William 
Appleman Williams and Walter LaFeber.  In his The New Empire: An Interpretation of 
American Expansion, 1860-1898 (1963), LaFeber set out to prove that the Spanish-
American War and the American acquisition of a colonial and informal empire that 
followed it were not a “great aberration,” as Bemis had labeled the phenomenon. Rather, 
LaFeber maintained that American policy at the turn of the century was part of and the 
result of three decades of evolution in American political and business thought which 
moved Americans away from an isolationist mindset to a more commercial one following 
the closing of the frontier.8   Likewise, David Green’s The Containment of Latin America 
(1971) was a radical/revisionist critique that saw international organizations as part of the 
United States’ approach to establish economic dominance over the region.9  There was 
also a subtle Marxist emphasis to this analysis, as it saw these policies as the 
requirements of capitalist enterprises.  R. A. Humphries in Latin America and the Second 
World War was interested in showing how the United States’ Cold War strategy eclipsed 
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its wartime friendship with South America.10  Likewise, Frederick Pike’s The United 
States and the Andean Republics looked at the relationship between the United States and 
three Andean nations and claimed there was a basic disconnect between the United 
States’ perception of the region and the way the region really operates.11 The United 
States, according to Pike, believes in individual initiative while the countries of the 
Andean region have very closed patron-client systems.  Thus, he characterized the 
relationship between the United States and these nations not as an economic struggle or 
even a political one, but as one of actual differing ideologies. 
Along the same lines, Stephen G. Rabe’s  Eisenhower and Latin America: The 
Foreign Policy of Anticommunism (1988) characterized United States policies toward the 
region as being driven by the fear of Soviet encroachment and a fierce anti-communist 
spirit.12  Rabe argued that the Eisenhower administration began by supporting highly-
flawed regimes in the region in the hopes of building anti-Soviet alliances.  It was not 
until backlash from the Latin American populations (e.g., over Vice President Nixon’s 
disastrous visit to Peru in 1958) challenged the Eisenhower administration’s belief that 
they were winning over the region that their approach began to shift to a more 
cooperative one.  The 1959 Cuban Revolution then shocked the United States further into 
attempting to actually stem the conditions which would lead to revolution, but also 
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increased the amount of covert activity which would later lead to added complications 
between the United States and Latin American partners.   Two additional volumes on 
diplomatic history which employ this perspective when dealing with the relationship 
between the United States and the region are Robert D. Schulzinger’s Henry Kissinger: 
Doctor of Diplomacy (1989), and Seymour Hersh’s  The Price of Power: Kissinger in the 
Nixon White House (1983).13  Additionally, Abraham F. Lowenthal’s  Partners in 
Conflict: The United States and Latin America in the 1990s (1990) examines the changes 
in a Latin America that has become more urban, increasingly middle class and industrial, 
and that is now less subject to coercion form the United States.14  
Despite taking a putatively more pro-Latin American perspective, many of the 
works adhering to the radical/revisionist perspective still continued to look at the issue 
from the point of view of the United States.  Rabe’s account, for instance, which is 
critical of United States motives, nevertheless is quite United States-centric and covers 
little ground with respect to the motivations of the Latin American countries themselves.  
He concludes that anti-communism was an obsession that caused mistakes or 
misperceptions, but that the Eisenhower policy was still coherent though ultimately 
unsuccessful in making the region a more engaged partner.  Rabe paid little attention to 
what role race may have had in defining the relationships in the region even though there 
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are hints throughout that this was a factor.  In the late 1980s-1990s as the Cold War was 
coming to an end, and the Andean nations began taking a larger role in the war on drugs, 
racial aspects came to be increasingly picked up by scholars, and Rabe’s model began to 
wane. 
Over the past twenty years, scholars have realized that too little attention has been 
paid to Latin American countries themselves as well as to sources or agency.  Recent 
work has tried to strike a balance by acknowledging the enormous impact of the United 
States while trying not to ignore the role of Latin America itself in shaping its own 
history.  Historians such as Lester Langley have been looking at Latin American sources 
and cultural approaches to write more complex histories dealing with both American and 
Latin American politics, social issues, and even race.15  Of note, in this group is Lars 
Schoultz’ Beneath the United States: A History of United States Policy Toward Latin 
America, -ostensibly a diplomatic history-which looks at the relationship between the 
United States and Latin America.16  In Schoultz’ narrative, the more powerful United 
States always tends to look down on and misunderstand its weaker partners.  Inherent in 
Schoultz’ argument is the idea of racism in so much that it is Latin America’s “Latin” 
character that causes the United States to look down on them.  Schoultz effectively uses 
various sources such as diplomatic dispatches and correspondences to prove a greater 
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point that much of the United States’ attitude toward Latin America has been based on 
the assumption that Latin Americans are “inferior.”   
Aside from the end of the Cold War, the anniversary of Columbus’ discovery of 
the New World also affected scholarship by inspiring increased interest in how the age of 
discovery had affected the development of the region, and further how the United States 
has interacted with the rest of the Americas.  The University of Georgia (UGA) 
underwrote an entire book series on United States relations with Latin America beginning 
with Lester Langley’s, America and the Americas: The United States in the Western 
Hemisphere (1989).17  This anniversary and the attention it drew also inspired other 
works which have looked at several of the same countries already included in the series, 
thereby adding to the richness of available literature on the region.  The UGA series, 
which was spread out over more than a decade, contributed greatly to the subject of 
United States relations with the Americas as a whole.  Aside from taking a good look at 
the subject at hand, these are a good starting point for scholars interested in the field 
though in some occasions developments in the region have moved at such a fast pace that 
some of the entries are no longer as relevant as they once were.  Interestingly, many of 
the UGA series entries have ascribed to Pike’s theory of differing interests and goals as 
being behind the conflicts between the United States and these countries. 
William Sater’s Chile and the United States: Empires in Conflict (1990) was the 
first of these books to deal with one of the Andean nations and claims that like the United 
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States, Chile’s attitudes toward its neighbors were fueled by a belief in its own racial and 
cultural superiority.18  European immigration into Chile had left it with a distinctly 
European-looking population and characteristics which were unmatched in the continent 
until Argentina surpassed it in this respect.  Sater then inserted race into his analysis in a 
degree and fashion that none of the others writing on Andean countries could have done.  
Interestingly, he carefully threads the needle when dealing with the United States 
involvement in the overthrow of Salvador Allende—a traditional sore spot in United 
States-Chile relations by admitting that the United States was rather more involved than it 
let on, but not particularly in any decisive way.   This is actually a point of contention 
among some scholars.  The idea that the United States was heavily involved in the 
overthrow of Allende is a recurring theme among some historians of the region.  Max 
Paul Friedman in his article “Retiring Puppets, Bringing Latin America Back in: Recent 
Scholarship on United States-Latin American Relations,” states as fact that the United 
States was behind the overthrow, though he does not go to any lengths to prove his point, 
simply assuming the reader will concur.19 Also, Paul Sigmund’s The United States and 
Democracy in Chile, argues that although the United States’ interest in Chile played a 
role in setting up the revolution, the United States was not directly responsible for the 
events.20  In fact, Sigmund ultimately argued that the United States was divided on its 
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support for the military at the time, seeing the greatest United States influence in the high 
level of importance that the United States Alliance for Progress gave to agrarian reform, 
which ironically actually led to the election of Allende in the first place.  Though 
Sigmund does allow that the United States did try to influence the election of 1970 to try 
to keep Allende from winning, he posits that this was done out of a legitimate fear that 
Allende’s election would mark the end of free elections in Chile.  Likewise, he does not 
argue that the United States was behind the coup against Allende, though he concedes 
that they clearly signaled that they would not oppose such an act, ironically echoing the 
events leading up to the secession of Panama from Colombia.   
The next book in the UGA series was Stephen Randall’s Colombia and the United 
States: Hegemony and Interdependence (1992) which was equally critical of the United 
States’ handling of the Panama secession as Bemis had been, but without attempting to 
make excuses for U.S. behavior.21  Unlike Bemis, Randall does not see this incident as a 
singular black mark in an otherwise spotless record which is now forgotten.  Instead, 
Randall argues that the event continues to haunt the relationship between the two 
countries to this day.  He further argues that Colombian-United States relations have been 
hindered greatly not only by competing interests but also by different cultures (once 
again hinting at Pike’s “basic disconnect”).  Randall’s book is at a bit of a disadvantage 
here as it was one of the earlier entries into this series and was written at a time when 
United States-Colombian relations were actually just beginning to improve rendering it 
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somewhat dated by today’s standards.  Without the benefit of hindsight, however, 
Randall could not document the very strong relationship that emerged between the United 
States and Colombia the way that Bradley Lynn Coleman later did in his more recent 
book Colombia and the United States: The Making of an Inter-American Alliance, 1939-
1960.  Coleman was able to document a more positive relationship between the two 
countries than Randall perhaps partly due to the fact that it was written after the 
relationship had already improved, allowing for some hindsight.22  Coleman argued that 
this relationship, despite having its ups and downs, had been remarkably positive 
throughout and particularly during the period he covers, making a big point about 
Colombia’s participation in the Korean War.  Coleman’s thesis is overall one of largely 
positive if not consistent engagement with the region.  
Randall’s entry on Colombia was followed by Judith Ewell’s, Venezuela and the 
United States: From Monroe's Hemisphere to Petroleum's Empire (1996) and Lawrence 
Clayton’s, Peru and the United States: The Condor and the Eagle (1999), both of which 
documented similar ambiguous relationships normally based on a power differential.23  
Neither of these two, however, ascribes directly to Pike’s thesis the way Kenneth Duane 
Lehman does in his, Bolivia and the United States: A Limited Partnership (1999) where 
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he juxtaposes Bolivian defeatist attitudes to the United States’ very positive outlook.24  
Perhaps demonstrating the relative lack of strategic importance to the United States that 
Ecuador has been perceived as having, a volume on Ecuador was slow to emerge.  When 
it did come, Ronn Pineo’s, Ecuador and the United States: Useful Strangers (2007) not 
surprisingly argued that lacking any particular appeal to the United States’ interests, 
Ecuador was largely ignored by the United States throughout its history.25  The United 
States, however, was ever present in Ecuador’s political calculations.  Pineo does 
subscribe to Pike’s thesis, but puts it in the context of simple lack of interest and 
characterizes the disconnect as resulting from one party having very modest and easily 
achievable interests on the part of the other which kept relations to a minimum (a fact 
made clear in the book’s subtitle). 
More recently, the rise of armed actors, narco-trafficking, and the United States’ 
war on drugs directly after the end of the Cold War led to a re-examination of the power 
relationship between the United States and the Andean nations whose territory was the 
setting for much of the production of illegal narcotics.  As early as 1993, David Bushnell 
in The Making of Modern Colombia: A Nation in Spite of Itself wrote that Colombia was 
“the least studied of the major Latin American countries and probably the least 
understood.”26  Bushnell’s surprisingly upbeat book (given the subtitle) makes the 
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argument that the political situation in Colombia stabilized because the political system 
was able to successfully make participatory democracy work.  Far from being the wreck 
flirting with becoming a failed state, as many described Colombia during the 1980s and 
90s, Colombia, according to Bushnell was actually remarkably stable and peaceful.  
Notably, the United States plays a very small role in this account.  Other books have 
looked at the subject itself rather than any specific country.  Paul Gootenberg’s Andean 
Cocaine: The Making of a Global Drug deals with the issue of cocaine as an Andean 
phenomenon, and not necessarily one that comes from any one country.27  Although he 
documents the contributions of several different countries in the history of cocaine, the 
end result is that the final conflict comes down to the United States versus the Andean 
world.   It was after all in the United States where the drug first found its market, and it 
was the United States whose anti-drug policies became the backbone of their 
relationships with many of the coca producing Andean nations of South America.   
The relationship between the United States and the countries of South America 
has therefore been both storied and long, and has passed through several different phases.  
Early works like that of Bemis were traditional pro-American narratives that celebrated 
the United States’ national myth while minimizing any negative actions toward its 
neighbors.  Later, the trend moved through several more negative views of American 
policies and goals, before retracting back to a more nuanced narrative in which the 
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United States was simply a player, albeit a powerful one, in a larger world.  This new 
narrative is not without its share of agency toward the nations of Latin America.   
In the end, the relationship that the United States has had with South America is 
difficult to define simply because of the diversity of both parties.  The United States has 
never been a single entity with a single mind that acts consistently with a given goal.  
Inasmuch as the United States has singular goals, they are largely generalized and usually 
the result of a consensus.  Many times, there are various competing interests with 
diametrically opposed goals.  The nations of South America also do not constitute a 
single entity either, but rather a community of nations with vastly different economies, 
resources, histories, and self-images.  The difficulty in trying to reconcile all these into a 
consistent policy has often been the stumbling block in the United States’ ability to deal 
with the region.  The United States often finds itself at cross purposes with the nations of 
South America as their goals are not the same, nor are their very definitions of such 
seemingly universal words as “democracy.”  The way that these have interacted 
constitutes a fascinating study in diplomatic relations. 
The history of U.S. relations specifically with the Caribbean has taken a slightly 
different path, however, usually dealing more broadly with western influence than strictly 
an American one.  This was partially because the region is distinct from mainland South 
America.  It is more heterogeneous, and had to deal with European colonial powers for a 
much longer time than the continent did.  The most common framework that has been 
used in analyzing the Caribbean has been the Braudelian Mediterranean model of world 
systems.  This model posits that the Caribbean, like the Mediterranean, is a living entity 
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onto itself, though dominated by a powerful hegemon (in the case of the Mediterranean 
this was Rome, in the case of the Caribbean this has been the United States).28  Although 
this comparison seems fairly straightforward, further scholarship has demonstrated that 
the model does not always hold.  The Caribbean is significantly culturally different than 
the Mediterranean in ways that often defy easy classification.  Although Braudel’s model 
is useful, it does not take into consideration the fact that a large portion of South America 
is also part of the Caribbean, which has been influenced by its own shared history with 
Spain.  In the end, there are structural weaknesses to this model which clearly call for a 
future reconsideration of how the Caribbean is seen, and point the way for future 
research.  
First published in 1944 and then updated in 1966, Eric Williams’ Capitalism and 
Slavery was one of the earliest and most influential books on the subject and the region.  
It was in Williams’ own words an attempt to, “place in historical perspective the relation 
between early capitalism in Europe, as exemplified by Great Britain, and the Negro slave 
trade and Negro slavery in the West Indies.”29  Williams saw the growth of the slave 
trade as natural extensions of the development of capitalism in Britain, and saw the end 
of the slave trade as the end result of Capitalist development.  In Williams’ analysis, the 
British humanitarian movement, long credited with ending slavery was actually only 
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another part of the society which had created the slave system to begin with.  As such, 
this movement was motivated by economic factors as much as the slave trade itself had 
been.  Not surprising for the time, Williams’ book is at heart a Marxist analysis arguing 
that the end of slavery was predicated by the economics of the establishment of a 
capitalistic world system.  He argued that by the final years of the slave trade, 
slaveholders had lost political power due to the inherent weaknesses of the slave system 
and were thus marginalized by laissez-faire advocates who disliked colonial monopolies.  
The decision to end the slave trade at first and later to do away with slavery altogether 
was an economic one seeking the expansion of capitalism.  Though never universally 
accepted, Williams’ study came to be seen as a pioneering work which requires citation 
whenever looking at Caribbean history of the period.   
Following up on his own work at the height of the Cold War, Eric Williams wrote 
an extensive survey of the history of the region.  In From Columbus to Castro: The 
History of the Caribbean, 1492-1969, he claimed that the very first expedition to the New 
World went forth with the knowledge that Africa could become “The white man’s 
greatest and most plastic collaborator in the task of agrarian colonization.” 30  The 
monopoly which emerged was simply an extension of the pre-existing monopoly that 
existed in Europe at the time.  This idea was later expanded by Franklin Knight when he 
pointed out that the very nature of the societies that first emerged in the Caribbean (and 
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even North America) were in fact simply continuations of the societies that existed in 
Europe at the time.31   
Looking at another aspect of the influence on the Caribbean, Alfred Crosby’s The 
Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492 took a more 
naturalistic approach, arguing that the actual physical makeup of the New World was 
affected by the coming of European settlers.  He began with an account of the differences 
noted in the New World by Columbus’ expedition when it first arrived in the Bahamas.  
Upon arrival, the members of this expedition did not find the sophisticated and exotic, yet 
documented land of the Khans they had expected to find.  In its place they were greeted 
by a visage of foreign looking flora and fauna and very small indigenous populations.  
None of the trees they saw were familiar to them, and there were no goats, or any other 
recognizable animals.  According to Columbus, “All the trees were as different from ours 
as day from night, and so the fruits, the herbage, the rocks and all things.”32  Moreover, 
the large mammals present in the Old World were mostly missing in the New.  Despite 
these differences, almost immediately, the interconnection of the two worlds began to 
make them more homogeneous, a process which Crosby said encompassed the next 
century.  Crosby’s approach was to take a scientific accounting of the consequences of 
the exchange between the two worlds.  He looked at population numbers, crop 
distribution, and medical data such as comparisons of blood type distribution in the Old 
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World and the New, and concluded that the closed system that was the New World very 
quickly influenced, and was in turn influenced by, contact with the Old World leading to 
an increased homogeneity which made both worlds very similar but diminished the 
variety of the gene pool in the process.  Crosby also documented how patterns of disease 
and crops spread within the New World in unexpected ways.  Potatoes, for example, 
originally existed only in South America, but soon spread to the North American 
continent by way of Europe where they had quickly become a staple crop. Thus, Crosby 
inserted a measure of agency to the literature which would influence future research.  
The end of the Cold War began to usher in more focused research on the specific 
influence the United States itself had on the region.  Typical of these early post-Cold War 
studies was Jules Benjamin’s, The United States and the Origins of the Cuban 
Revolution: An Empire of Liberty in an Age of National Liberation (1990).  According to 
Benjamin, Cuba’s independence was directly affected by U.S. expansionism during the 
previous century, and the Castro regime’s alliance with the United States’ Cold War 
enemy was a direct affront to emerging American power and prestige a mere ninety miles 
from its coast.  Benjamin’s book clearly takes a very negative approach to the United 
States and lays the blame for the emergence of the Castro regime squarely on the 
shoulders of American policies.  He tracked U.S. policy going back to the Spanish-
American War and found that the Americans from the very beginning established a self-
fulfilling prophecy of instability in the island, which they never took seriously as a 
possible partner nation.  In fact, Benjamin portrays the United States as never having 
understood the desires of Cuban nationals for independence and justice and having 
assumed that they should be happy to accept American hegemony.  In his estimation, 
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then, the emergence of the Castro regime was nothing but a natural reaction to American 
interventionism.33  
Aside from the end of the Cold War, the anniversary of Columbus’ voyages 
affected Caribbean historiography in a similar way as it had impacted the works on the 
United States and South America mentioned above.  Peter Hulme’s Colonial Encounters: 
Europe and the Native Caribbean, 1492-1797 (1992) is among a series of books 
analyzing the region around this time.  According to Hulme, the coming of European 
settlers began one of the most dramatic demographic shifts in human history.  Hulme 
touched on this change while examining the origin of the word “cannibal” as it came to 
be synonymous with man-eater.  According to Columbus’ diary, his party encountered a 
population of Arawaks and found that they were greatly afraid of a people which they 
described as “Caniba” who they said were very war-like and ate people.  Columbus’ 
assertion (after some dithering on the subject) was that the use of the word “Caniba” was 
the native’s way of referring to “la gente del gran can.”34   In other words, Columbus 
was convinced that though they had not found the expansive kingdom of the Khans, it 
was not far away.  One important aspect of this book is that the documentation for this 
time period is fragmentary at best.  Caribbean tribes that were wiped out by invasion, 
deportation, or disease did not leave any written records to be analyzed.  For this reason, 
Hulme did not limit himself to simple historical sources, but actually included a couple of 
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purely literary works; the relations between Prospero and Caliban in William 
Shakespeare’s The Temptest (1610~1611 est.) and the relationship between Robinson 
Crusoe and Friday in Daniel Dafoe’s Robinson Crusoe (1719).  For his part, Hulme 
referred to these selections as representative rather than comprehensive, and called his 
book a work of “Colonial discourse.”   Hulme demonstrated how these different 
encounters served to stigmatize the Carib population that inhabited the region in a way 
that was later used by European powers, and later the United States to justify their 
treatment of the islanders and argues that the very term Carib as well as the suggestions 
of cannibalism which developed around it was a function of distinguishing the islanders 
from the Europeans and therefore was a way of establishing ‘otherness’ among them.  To 
this purpose, the depiction of the islanders as cannibals was an important step in defining 
them as savage and non-Christian.   
Hulme revisited some of his previous issues in his collaboration with Neil 
Whitehead in their study, Wild Majesty: Encounters with Caribs from Columbus to the 
Present Day, An Anthology.  Here, Hulme and Whitehead sought to give an account of 
the relations between island Caribs and Europeans over a five hundred year period.  
Hulme and Whitehead’s perspective and their loyalties are clearly with the natives as 
they were systematically reduced, chased off, and in some cases (such as that of the 
“black Caribs”) deported to Central America where they would form new communities 
and societies. 35 
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Also in 1992, Phillip Boucher’s Cannibal Encounters: Europeans and Island 
Caribs, 1492-1763 likewise sought tell the story of the early encounters between 
Europeans and island Caribs in an attempt to deal with unexplored ideas that were 
brought up by earlier studies.  Boucher’s main argument, much like Hulme’s is that the 
image of the “Carib” as a man eater was the result of European desires to brand these 
people as the “other” so that they may be more easily marginalized and if necessary 
eliminated.  Eliminating a human society would have carried with it a very high social 
and religious stigma that eliminating cannibalistic tribes would not.  In many cases, 
Europeans simply believed Spanish claims about cannibalism without questioning them.  
This is ironic because as Hulme previously documented, Columbus himself did not 
believe the stories told by the islanders he encountered, and attributed them to fear caused 
by the disappearance of members of their populations who would be captured by other 
tribes (Columbus believed they were being captured by the Khan’s people) and would 
never return.36 
Boucher’s goal was thus twofold; he wanted to dispel the myth of the Caribs as 
cannibals, portraying them as peaceful people, and document how the differing 
approaches to colonization had different results.  He asserted that the near parity between 
the populations of English and French settlements in the Caribbean (vs. mainland North 
or South America) meant that the success of the French approach to relations with these 
people was not simply due to demographic factors.  The French in general had a tradition 
of humanism which admired the noble savage and saw the islanders with kinder eyes. In 
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addition, French disappointment at the state of “civilization” allowed for the Caribs to be 
viewed in a more sympathetic light.   He also engages in native agency by positing that 
the Caribs were initially able to play the different European groups against each other.37  
Like Hulme, he concludes that the cannibal myth came as a result of trying to 
differentiate the “good” natives from the “bad” ones but does not believe it had a basis in 
fact, only Spanish propaganda.  Boucher argues that migration patterns were key to 
understanding the emergence of different cultures and is very detailed in depicting each 
culture.  
Going somewhat counter to these previous books, Jan Rogozinski’s A Brief 
History of the Caribbean: From the Arawak and the Carib to the Present (1999) sees the 
Caribbean societies as more than just the result of European colonization.   Rogozinski’s 
central theme is that the islands of the Caribbean share a common heritage, regardless of 
who settled them.  He goes a bit further by suggesting that these similarities are the result 
of not only the colonial experience, but also of geography, weather, geology, and how 
these influenced the way the region developed.  In fact, aside from race and history, 
Rogozinski feels that even attributes such as weather and difficulty of travel have been 
central to the similarities and development of the region.38  These similarities, however, 
had the effect of making the native populations susceptible to European, and later 
                                                          
37.  Philip P. Boucher, Cannibal Encounters: Europeans and Island Caribs, 1492-1763 (Baltimore, MD: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 61-93. 
38.  Jan Rogoziński,  A Brief History of the Caribbean: From the Arawak and the Carib to the Present.  
(New York: Penguin Putnam, 1999), Chap. 1. 
36 
 
American exploitation.  The shared experience of American chattel slavery then became 
the last aspect that would unify the region and give it a distinct character. 
In 1994, Robert Freeman Smith’s The Caribbean World and the United States: 
Mixing Rum and Coca-Cola took a more positive outlook on the strained relationship 
between the United States and the region than earlier works had.  Freeman Smith claimed 
that U.S. foreign policy had been generally successful in the region, and to this end, he 
cited the region’s relative freedom from foreign control and influence.  He claimed that 
(with the obvious exceptions of Cuba and Haiti) freedom, democracy, and respect for 
human rights were at higher rates than at any time since the Spanish conquest.  Though 
the author admitted that the United States’ propensity to use military force had been a 
troubling practice, he concluded that the actual results had been mixed to positive in that 
the United States had always voluntarily withdrawn.  Moreover, Freeman Smith asserted 
that lasting peace may never come to the region, as it may never come to the world at 
large, but did not believe the United States was at fault for this.  He also documented the 
cultural exchanges between the United States and the Caribbean (such as the rum and 
Coca-Cola of his title) and saw them as being mostly positive as opposed to the result of 
economic imperialism the way others had.39 
G. Pope Atkins and Larman C. Wilson’s The Dominican Republic and the United 
States: From Imperialism to Transnationalism (1998) sought to give as definitive a look 
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as possible to the history of U.S. relations with this island nation.  The authors tried to 
remain even-handed but there was a natural bias which came from being mostly confined 
to using U.S. sources.  Coming out at a time when Dominican studies were becoming 
more popular, this book argued that despite what can easily be seen as an uneven 
relationship both parties have actually had an influence on each other.  This is an issue 
that was particularly pronounced as U.S. interests increasingly looked toward the 
Caribbean and have only grown as the Dominican Republic has become a major factor on 
the war on drugs.  Overall, Atkins and Wilson were very critical of the Trujillo 
dictatorship but seemed enthusiastic about increased relations with the United States.40   
Also in 1998, Eric Roorda’s The Dictator Next Door: The Good Neighbor Policy 
and the Trujillo Regime in the Dominican Republic, 1930-1945 examined how the Good 
Neighbor Policy the United States pursued in the face of the growing axis threat affected 
the balance of power in the Caribbean.  This book is part of Duke University Press’ series 
“American Encounters/Global Interactions” and it followed the emerging trend of turning 
the traditional understanding of the power dynamic on its head.  Traditionally, the 
narrative had been that through the use of American sponsorship, dictators such as 
Trujillo and Somoza were able to maintain a power base from which to rule their 
countries and in turn, were subservient to the United States who was ensuring their 
survival.  Roorda, however, found that Trujillo was skillfully able to manipulate the 
situation himself through the use of balance of power, paid lobbyists, and even occasional 
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bribery to keep the United States on his side despite his admittedly atrocious human 
rights record.  According to Roorda, Trujillo was so successful that he essentially “seized 
and held the initiative in the bilateral relationship with the United States.”41  One of 
Roorda’s most successful contributions was his demonstration that the heterogeneity of 
the U.S. administration and how Trujillo was able to exploit this heterogeneousness for 
his own goals.  Where he fell short is in his depiction of Trujillo himself who tends to 
come across as a singular force to be dealt with which suggests some agency being 
employed by the author.  Of note, both these last two books demonstrated the growing 
trend of showing how the influence flowed both ways.   
Capitalizing on the fortieth anniversary of the Cuban Revolution in 1999, several 
books came out regarding U.S. relations with that island.  Marifeli Pérez-Stable took a 
more conciliatory approach than Jules Benjamin had in analyzing the relationship 
between Cuba and the United States in her book, The Cuban Revolution: Origins, 
Course, and Legacy.  While largely agreeing with some of Benjamin’s points, her stated 
goal was to bridge the gap of systematic historical inquiry that she thought the Cuban 
revolution had not elicited.  She stated her study “subscribes to the main proposition of 
contemporary Cuban historiography [that] the origins of the Cuban revolution lie in the 
independence movement against Spain and the frustration of its aspirations in the Cuban 
republic.”  According to Pérez-Stable, the independence movement originally had 
elements of social justice attached to it which were thwarted by the U.S. intervention not 
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letting Cuba become independent under its own terms.  Despite this, Pérez-Stable was not 
as outwardly critical of the United States as Benjamin and wished for reconciliation 
between the two nations.42   
Also that year, Ada Ferrer’s Insurgent Cuba: Race, Nation, and Revolution, 1868-
1898, took a narrow look at the thirty-year period during which Cuba gained its 
independence.43  This book was much more concerned with race and class than previous 
efforts, in line with the current trend in American historiography, but did not exclusively 
point the finger at the United States for Cuba’s racial problems.  Ferrer argued that as a 
result of the three wars which were fought to bring Cuba’s independence from Spain, the 
Cuban insurgents came to seek an egalitarian society shared by black and white Cubans 
alike, which was in stark contrast to the racism that had increasingly arisen in the United 
States at the time.  According to Ferrer, the initial failures of the revolutionary 
movements were due to the exploitation of racial tensions by the Spanish who effectively 
scared the white insurgents out of accepting their black counterparts and drove a wedge 
between the two.  Unlike Benjamin’s implicit assertion of racism, Ferrer argued that the 
increasing amount of racism was not a result of American attitudes being forced on 
Cubans, but that of the white insurgents re-asserting attitudes that they had put aside in 
the interest of creating a united front now that the conflict was coming to an end.  Of 
particular note, Ferrer argued that success in revolutionary endeavors only came about 
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after the Cubans were able to get past these divisions, leaving the Spanish without the 
ability to divide and conquer and made them have to depend on their inferior military 
position.  The struggle was actually three different struggles, the first two of which 
succumbed to racial strife while the third one was successful by rising above it, though 
she claims that the racial hierarchy eventually reasserted itself.  According to Ferrer, this 
reassertion took place before the entry of the Americans so they could not be faulted for 
it. 
As the new century began in a unipolar world, a growing trend was to look at how 
the United States had dealt with the region militarily.  Mary Renda’s Taking Haiti: 
Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915-1940 (2001) looked at a 
neglected chapter in Haitian-American relations: the first U.S. occupation in Haiti.  
Renda’s analysis was not simply the traditional narrative of domination, but actually took 
the position that the events surrounding the first U.S. occupation actually had a cultural 
effect on the United States that was at least as significant as the effect that it had on Haiti.  
She also took a strong look at gender roles in the occupation and its aftermath.  The book 
argued that despite being largely ignored, this incident was actually a major event in the 
history of both nations.  Renda asserted that the (as she calls it) “United States American” 
occupation of Haiti was a pivotal moment in the history of both nations.  The United 
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States, emerging as it was onto the world stage, took the opportunity to assert its power 
over the weaker nation in the name of a form of paternalism. 44   
Renda examined how the idea of paternalism was particularly appealing to 
American Marines who were adjusting to the changing roles of masculinity back home as 
the women’s movement and increasing industrialization took away the individualistic 
tendencies in male roles.  Renda further argued that, "Wilson's policy toward Haiti did 
not result from the failure of his liberal vision ... but rather from the logical, if usually 
hidden, implications of that vision," though she did not necessarily follow through on 
what this might mean for liberal thought.  In this, she broke from the traditional narrative 
that Woodrow Wilson’s benevolent goals were undermined by the inherent bigotry 
displayed by the many southern soldiers who made up the occupation.  Interestingly, 
Renda did not always portray this paternalism negatively and made it clear that some 
Marines saw themselves as stewards of the population.  Indeed, Renda took great pains to 
try to capture their story through letters, postcards, journal entries, and actual written 
orders, but the power relationship was always such that any disobedience would be seen 
in the most negative light possible, as of a father needing to discipline an unruly child.45 
Looking at the effect the Haitian revolution had on the United States, Gordon 
Brown’s Toussaint's Clause: The Founding Fathers and the Haitian Revolution (2005) 
used contemporaneous documents to provide a glimpse into the diplomatic process via 
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which the early United States dealt with the newly independent Haitian nation.46  
Interestingly, Brown’s narrative did not portray the early American republic as 
necessarily hostile to Haitian independence.  In fact, the very title of the book refers to a 
specific clause which exempted Haiti, (then St. Domingue) from an embargo aimed at 
France during its “quasi-war” with the United States; a high water mark of United States-
Haitian relations.  This relationship became soured after the election of the strongly pro-
French Thomas Jefferson, but even here Brown noted that the fallout was not immediate 
and was predicated on external diplomatic factors.  Despite the fact that Jefferson was a 
slave owner, his relationship with Haiti was, according to Brown, mostly guided by 
American interests vis-à-vis its relationship with France and sometimes Britain.  Brown 
did not necessarily attribute major hostility toward Haiti as being driven by racism either, 
but by diplomatic policy and necessity. 
Also examining U.S. military adventurism in the Caribbean, Harvey Neptune’s  
Caliban and the Yankees: Trinidad and the United States Occupation (2007) looked at 
the American intervention in Trinidad during the war years.  Much like Renda’s book, 
Caliban is largely a work of social history that looks at the specific period of U.S. 
presence in Trinidad which the local population refers to simply as the “occupation.”  
Ostensibly there as part of a “Destroyers for Bases” agreement, United States servicemen 
soon arrived in numbers that were significant given the relatively small population of the 
island (25,000 troops for an island of 500,000 according to Neptune).  Though alternately 
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referred to as a time of exploitation or cooperation by either one of the participants, 
Neptune argued that the relationship was actually remarkably ambiguous from beginning 
to end.  This is particularly fascinating because at the time, Trinidad was a British 
possession and not an independent nation, so in effect the American presence was 
undermining the authority of one of its allies in the war.  American servicemen having 
encounters or even developing relationships with Trinidadian women of color also 
undermined British practices of racial separation. 47   
Interestingly, instead of mobilizing against the United States occupation as 
happened elsewhere in the Caribbean, Neptune found that Trinidadians embraced the 
base and took advantage of the opportunities the American presence brought with it.  
Ironically this still contributed to decolonization not by galvanizing opposition to the 
occupier, but by undermining the power of the colonizing power.  There are several 
factors that seem to have contributed to this including the fact that the United States was 
not the colonial power, and the fact that the United States presence was understood to be 
temporary and was actually there to provide protection against German forces which 
were perceived as an actual threat.  Neptune further looks at the cultural influence that the 
occupation had including looking at things such as fashion and music (Calypso music is 
said to have developed around this time).  It is interesting to note that Neptune used the 
same analogy as Hulme had fifteen years prior by identifying the Trinidadian people with 
the character of Caliban in Shakespeare’s The Tempest, though in this case, highlighting 
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the amicable relationship that existed with Prospero rather than the “otherness” of the 
character.   
Continuing with the trend of looking at the relationship militarily was Jason 
Parker’s Brother's Keeper: The United States, Race, and Empire in the British 
Caribbean, 1937-1962 (2008).  Parker used a largely Braudellian Mediterranean model in 
his analysis and mostly ignored the social history side of the events, although he was 
writing about roughly the same period as Neptune.  He found a much different 
relationship between the United States and Trinidad (and in this case also Jamaica).  
Though he acknowledges the importance of the Caribbean Basin to the protection of the 
area around the time of the war, the fact that he continued his narrative well into the Cold 
War is significant, and may explain why his conclusions differ from those of Neptune.  
Islanders who might have welcomed a U.S. presence during the war under the 
assumption it was temporary and only meant to exist during the conflict, would have had 
a much different view as this presence continued past the stated conflict and into the Cold 
War era.  Parker is not as interested in social history as Neptune was, focusing more on 
the diplomatic relations between the governments of the United States, Great Britain, and 
the two island nations.  Parker did look at something Neptune neglected which is the role 
that Caribbean expatriates had in influencing U.S. attitudes once they came to the United 
States.  Also, Parker’s time period allows him to look at aspects of the relationship which 
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fall outside Neptune’s book such as how the Cuban Revolution affected U.S. policies 
toward the Caribbean islands. 48    
As can be seen, actual works dealing with the Caribbean Defense Command are 
something that is difficult to come by, and the history of joint commands only recently 
began receiving attention.  For now, searches for pertinent literature necessarily have to 
look at tangential issues in other books.  Much of the available literature has traditionally 
subscribed to the dependency theory, characterizing the United States as an imperial 
power over the region. Typical of this approach is Jack Nelson- Pallmeyer’s School for 
Assasins: The Case for Closing the School of the Americas and Fundamentally Changing 
U.S. Foreign Policy (1997).49  As the title implies, Pallmeyer argues that U.S. 
involvement in the region has been largely negative and detrimental.  As referenced 
above, Harvey Neptune’s Caliban and the Yankees and Jason Parker’s Brother’s Keeper  
which came ten years after School for Assassins, dealt more closely with the specific 
period and setting and took a slightly less negative approach with Neptune calling the 
relationship ambiguous and Parker characterizing it as positive, at least during World 
War II.  Coleman’s previously cited book, Colombia and the United States, which came 
out the same year as Parker’s also continued the trend of characterizing the U.S.-Latin 
American relationship in a less negative light.  
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The most direct treatment of the subject is Cynthia Watson’s Combatant 
Commands: Origins, Structure, and Engagements (2011).50  Watson is mostly concerned 
with bringing the reader up on the current state of affairs and thus choses to focus simply 
on the existing COCOMs , though she does give brief histories of previous ones.  
Looking at almost exclusively open-source American documents however, she largely 
neglects to look at the nations which encompass the AORs of these commands and 
approaches the subject from a purely American perspective.  Overall, her treatment of the 
relationship the United States has with the nations in these AORs is predominantly one of 
cooperation, in line with Bradley Coleman’s analysis, which is to be expected from an 
American military historian writing on contemporary events where the new military 
paradigm is to see these as partner nations.  Her book follows a narrative structure and 
has a separate chapter for each command.  Because of her emphasis on the current 
command structure established by the 1947 Unified Command Plan, she treats Pacific 
Command as the oldest of the joint combatant commands and places Southern Command 
as the third to be established (after EUCOM) because of its establishment in 1963.  
Watson does not go very heavily into the history of SOUTHCOM’s predecessor 
commands, and dedicates two lone paragraphs totaling less than one page to the CDC.  
Watson argues that the current system of joint regional combatant commands is actually 
the result of a gradual evolution which began in 1947 following the establishment of the 
Unified Command Plan, as an early move in the Cold War, and was prodded along by 
historical events which resulted in fledgling attempts to engage diplomatically with the 
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nations of each command’s respective region.  Thus, she sees the current system of 
regional COCOMs as being the result of the natural evolution of the military in line with 
trends that reached back to the United States’ traditional distrust for military power.  She 
also argues that this trend culminated in the final division of the entire globe under 
different regional COCOMs in a process that began in 1947 and culminated with the 
2007 creation of Africa Command. 
Challenging both Nelson-Pallmeyer and Watson, this dissertation will 
demonstrate that the process which led to the current state of regional combatant 
commands actually predated the 1947 Unified Command Plan and formally began in 
1941 with the creation of the Caribbean Defense Command, and that the CDC was both 
an early (albeit imperfect) attempt to engage with the nations of the region and an early 
foray into what would later be called a “whole of government approach.”  I will 
demonstrate that it was this attempt then, which set the stage for the 1947 reforms which 
led to the eventual establishment of the COCOM system as it is today. 
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CHAPTER 1: Background 
 
The establishment of the Caribbean Defense Command actually preceded U.S. entry into 
World War II, though not by much.  This was as much a demonstration of how seriously 
the threat of war was being taken as of how prescient U.S. planners had been in their 
assessments of the situation.  The work of setting up the CDC was both military and 
diplomatic.  As the nearest point of U.S. authority in the region, it would become an easy 
venue for foreign governments to communicate with the United States.  Like the 
combatant commands that would come after it, the CDC would also oversee various 
subordinate commands, normally encompassing a single branch of military service which 
would all have to be brought together to enact a comprehensive and consistent military 
plan for the region.  This would mean that logistics would be a constant effort throughout 
the Command’s history. 
During the years preceding the U.S. entry into World War II, while officially 
pursuing a path of neutrality, the Franklin Roosevelt administration became increasingly 
concerned with the possibility of hostilities spreading to the western hemisphere.  Of 
particular note was the presence of Axis sympathizers within Latin America, and the 
relative lack of protection of the Panama Canal and its access points which posed a 
serious problem due to their very nature.  Building the Canal had been a monumental feat 
of logistics and engineering, and it was (and remains) a highly sophisticated system 
which depends on intricate workings and various moving parts.  Sabotage of any of a 
number of these parts could easily render the canal inoperable.  The Canal was not only a 
major passageway for commerce and a huge logistical asset, but also ironically, had 
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become both a symbol of American power in the region and a potential weak spot in the 
U.S. defenses.  It was widely assumed that the Canal would present a very tempting 
target to any possible belligerents should the United States enter the war.   
Another problem facing the Canal and Canal Zone was a consequence of the 
tortured history of its creation.  The actions the United States had taken in order to secure 
the legal rights to build the canal were among the most controversial in the history of 
inter-American relations.  The United States had initially sought to build a canal through 
Nicaragua, while a competing French effort was underway in Panama.  The French effort 
fell apart leaving some of the initial infrastructure and planning in place looking for new 
investors.  After several surveys determined that Panama would be the most viable 
location for such a canal, the United States purchased the rights to the French effort and 
began work toward completing it.51 
At the time, Panama was still a part of Colombia and while negotiating with the 
Colombian government for rights to build the canal, the United States had initially 
assured the Colombian government of its commitment to respect Colombia’s territorial 
integrity.  Things took a turn for the worse when negotiations stalled, and the United 
States switched course and effectively supported a Panamanian separatist movement 
which they felt would be more amicable to American demands.  The separatists in effect 
traded access to the Canal Zone for U.S. backing of Panama’s newly established 
sovereignty.  The United States had not actually taken any military action throughout this 
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crisis but it did take a series of actions designed to delay the Colombian government’s 
response to the rebels until the point became moot.  Although these actions were widely 
condemned, most of the neighboring countries had by that time already recognized 
Panama’s independence.  By its actions, the United States had made the retention of the 
province by Colombia impossible.   
This episode tainted the United States’ relationship with Colombia for many 
years, and was a cause of great criticism among many in Latin America, though it 
initially had mixed effects on actual diplomatic relations with the rest of the Andean 
nations.  As historian Stephen Randall would later state,  
The actions of the Theodore Roosevelt administration in the crisis of 1903 rightly 
 earned Colombian wrath.  United States encouragement of secessionist leaders, 
 the almost immediate recognition of the rebel government as an independent 
 republic, the immediate conclusion of a canal treaty with representatives of that 
 government, and interference with Colombian military forces attempting to 
 suppress insurrection made impossible Colombian retention of the isthmus.52   
Even Samuel Flagg Bemis’ very pro-American take on it said the incident was a 
“really black mark in the Latin American policy of the United States” which he claimed 
was only rubbed off “after much grief by the reparations treaty of 1921.”53 
Notwithstanding Bemis’ claims that the stigma of U.S. actions had improved, relations 
had not really markedly changed in the years leading up to World War II.  The U.S. 
proceeded with the building and later running of the Canal, but aside from the nearly 
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universally lauded technical achievement of succeeding, relations remained poor for 
some time. 
The Canal was completed in 1914, almost concurrently with the beginning of 
World War I.  In fact, the first test crossing of the Canal on August 3, 1914 by the cement 
barge Cristobal happened on the same day that Germany declared war on France.54  The 
Canal Commission which had overseen the construction phase of the Canal was officially 
replaced by the Canal Zone administration, which was largely Army Centric, and this 
remained the status quo during the war.  Interestingly, the First World War was not as 
significant an event for the region as the Second would become, and there was no attempt 
to form a joint command as would happen in 1941.  This was likely due to several 
factors.  The United States did not enter the war until 1917, and when it did, it did not 
face a two front war where the Canal would serve as a vital waterway to supply the 
American military machine.  The Canal, moreover, was relatively new and untested so its 
value was not immediately apparent.  Furthermore, German submarine activity ironically 
hid the potential value of the Canal by severely reducing commercial shipping through 
the Canal.  In fact, the Canal was so sparsely used that one estimate claimed the daily 
number of transits through the Canal during the war could be “counted on the fingers of 
one hand.”55   
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In the years after the First World War, while pursuing a somewhat isolationist 
policy, the United States had remained engaged in the region, but had largely neglected 
diplomacy with its southern neighbors, preferring often heavy handed military 
intervention such as in Panama, Haiti, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic.  As a 
result, by the mid-1930s both diplomatic relations and the reputation of the United States 
in the region had suffered. This made the Canal Zone an American exclave of significant 
size surrounded by what was perceived as increasingly hostile neighbors.  Should war 
break out, a large population of American citizens living in the Canal Zone, including 
many members of the military would be isolated in a region that was not predisposed to 
treat them kindly.  It was clear that a simple military solution would not easily suffice in 
dealing with all these issues.  Should the Canal Zone be quickly overrun by a hostile 
force, the likelihood of large numbers of American prisoners or hostages likely loomed 
large in the minds of decision makers.  Military doctrine often stresses that weakness 
provokes aggression, and the Canal and Canal Zone projected a major potential Achilles 
heel to the United States in a time of spreading global conflict.   
Another problem with defending the Canal was a purely logistical one.  The Canal 
Zone was traditionally under the care of the U.S. Army.  Although the Army is 
traditionally the right venue for protection of territory from land based attacks, the Canal 
can be approached from either land or water.  What aviation assets existed still fell under 
the Army Air Corps, but the technology of the time was not robust enough to effectively 
project American power or protection over the entire Caribbean, or of reaching the Canal 
from the continental United States in time and with enough strength to make a difference 
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should things turn sour.  This weakness had the potential to affect all the paths leading to 
the Canal itself.  Ideally, any plan to protect these approaches would have to rely partly 
on sea power, meaning that they would necessarily have to rely on the U.S. Navy.  Inter-
service cooperation was not something that could easily be counted on in times of peace 
where competition for resources was a constant point of contention, but it would be 
necessary if any significant plan could be put in place to effectively protect the Canal in a 
time of war. It was clear in the years leading to war that as much of an asset as the 
Panama Canal and Canal Zone were, they presented a unique challenge in maintaining 
the U.S. defense of the hemisphere.  The Canal had to be defended, but its defense had to 
encompass an overall approach that would marry ground, air, and naval forces in a 
coordinated and comprehensive plan which would be directed by a single head.  
The solution lay in the establishment of a new and innovative entity.  The 
Caribbean Defense Command was formally established in 1941and its various 
components and subcommands were activated shortly thereafter.  Though it would never 
quite function as well as intended, it would serve as a prototype military command which 
would deal jointly with the different branches of the services (mostly Army and Navy) in 
a manner that would later be adopted throughout the U.S. military.  
Setting the Stage 
The activities which led to the creation of the Caribbean Defense Command 
began before the war in Europe was formally declared.  These took the form of 
diplomatic moves in which the United States first sought to improve its relationship with 
its southern neighbors.  German aggression and territorial expansion were on the rise, and 
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the relative weakness of some of the nations in Latin America, as well as the known 
existence of Nazi sympathizers within their borders, had the potential to make them 
susceptible to foreign influences.  This phenomenon, however, was not entirely lost on 
the Latin American nations themselves and in a series of meetings, various international 
agreements were hammered out with the aim of diminishing any possible foreign 
aggression.  An Inter-American conference was held in Buenos Aires in 1936 which 
resulted in the creation of the “Declaration of principles of inter-American solidarity and 
cooperation.”56  Though it did not single out any aggressor by name, it demonstrated a 
marked fear that Axis aggression in particular would spread to Latin America.57  This 
was later joined by the “Declaration of Lima” which followed a meeting by nations in 
continental South America.  Established in December 1938, this Declaration cemented 
the resolve of all parties involved to act in solidarity “in case the peace, security, or 
territorial integrity of any American Republic is threatened by acts of any nature that may 
impair them.”58  Finally, the Declaration of Panama in September of 1939 aligned 
Central American nations with the United States in the creation of a maritime security 
zone.59  Though never officially stating it, inclusion of the United States into these 
                                                          
56.  History of the Caribbean Defense Command, Introduction and Background.  Internal U.S. Caribbean 
Defense Command Report, 1945, Archives of the United States Southern Command, Miami, Florida 
[hereafter, SOUTHCOM Archives], “CMH CDC 08.2.08 AA,” p. 5.  (Hereafter cited as History of the 
Command.)   
57.  History of the Command, 5. 
58.  U.S. Congress, Department of State.  Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers, 1938. 
(In five volumes) Volume V. The American Republics. Serial Set Vol. No. 10355-5, Session Vol. No. 36, 
76th Congress, 1st Session. H.Doc. 473 Vol.5, pp. 83-84 and 88.  
59.  History of the Command, 5.  
55 
 
meetings and agreements signaled a willingness to accept U.S. leadership in defense of 
the region.   
The idea of possible invasion, though, was not the only issue of concern to the 
region.  Once war formally broke out, a more concrete concern arose following the quick 
capitulation of France and Holland.  Both of these countries had territorial possessions in 
the Western hemisphere.  Dutch colonies in the Caribbean had existed since early on in 
the age of discovery, and both countries had Caribbean possessions as well as large 
colonies in continental South America, French Guiana, and Dutch Guiana (now 
Surinam).  The fall of these two countries to the Axis forces brought into question the 
status of French and Dutch colonies.  The very different status of the two countries once 
conquered, as well as their relationships with their colonies before the war, further 
complicated matters in dealing with the colonies.   Dutch colonies were traditionally far 
more independent than French colonies and seemed determined to protect their territorial 
integrity and sovereignty.  French Guiana and the French West Indies, however, were 
loyal to the Vichy French regime which had been established as a puppet regime of the 
greater German Reich and which had quickly adopted Nazi practices and institutions.60  
Having a regime allied with Nazi Germany on the continent gave the Axis a potential 
beach head in any attempts to spread the war to the Western Hemisphere.  This troubling 
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development eventually led to a meeting in Havana, Cuba in July 1940 where attending 
nations attempted to iron out a framework for cooperation during wartime.61  
The newfound cooperation among the nations of Latin America was a stroke of 
luck for the United States, as it continued the process of attempting to repair its reputation 
with the region.  While the 1903 Panama treaty had been toxic to U.S.-Panama relations, 
and the 1921 revision was only marginally more popular, a new 1936 revised treaty 
which had sought to position Panama as a partner was better received if not altogether 
satisfactory.  Some of the new terms were still of concern to Panama, but overall the 
relaxed restrictions on its citizens as well as further protection of territorial integrity was 
enough to keep the government of Panama from outright opposing U.S. military efforts.  
In the end, Panama fully, if grudgingly, met all the requirements of the revised treaty as it 
pertained to the war effort.62  By the fall of 1940, bi-lateral military staff conversations 
had occurred with almost every Central American, South American, and Caribbean 
republic totaling 20 out of 21 nations to provide the United States support to resist axis 
inspired subversive elements.  Only Panama abstained from these and the official 
summary suggested this was because they would deal directly with the Commanding 
General of the Panama Canal Department.  In every one of these cases, a satisfactory 
bilateral basis for cooperation was established.63 
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The issue of cooperation was key in both the establishment and work of the 
Caribbean Defense Command.  The United States found that it had a fairly open road to 
cooperation from its southern neighbors many of whom were just as fearful of the war 
spreading to the region. In fact, following the Pearl Harbor attack, Nicaragua 
immediately offered its territory (land, water, and air) for U.S. use as long as the war 
persisted.  Nicaragua was not alone.  Cuba and El Salvador granted the United States 
permission to fly planes over their territory in early 1942.64  Colombia offered up part of 
its territory for a seaplane base after Axis submarines sank one of their Schooners and 
killed several of their military personnel.  Around this time, the Peruvian government 
asked for U.S. assistance in fortifying its coastal defenses and was offered supplies via 
lend-lease agreements.65  Even Chile, which had a traditionally poor relationship with the 
United States and a significant population sympathetic to the Axis cause, was eventually 
persuaded to break with the Axis despite several strong ties to both Germany and Italy.66  
By the end of hostilities, nearly every nation in the region had entered the war on the side 
of the Allies, many of them lending material support, though only Brazil sent a 
significant military presence. 
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The nature of the enemy turned out to be a fortunate factor for the United States 
as it made it easier to pursue partnerships with its overwhelmingly non-Aryan neighbors 
to the south.  Additionally, the nature of the staff conversations made it clear that many of 
the nations of Latin America were fearful of attacks from a “non-American” state or by 
proxy from fifth column supporters of such a state.67  The years leading up to the war 
would turn out to be fruitful for expanding diplomatic efforts, if nevertheless frustrating 
in uncertainty about the future.  The perceived threat to the region from Axis aggression 
would play a large role in the preparations that the United States was able to have in 
place by the time it entered the war.  
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CHAPTER 2: 1935-1941, Preparing the Way 
 
As stated, the years leading up to the creation of the Caribbean Defense Command, and 
the U.S. entry into the war were filled with a great deal of preparation and movement in 
the Caribbean.  Many of the preparations included the creation and activation of several 
military units.  All the military units that were activated throughout this period, however, 
were single service (usually either Army or Navy), lacking any joint command structure.  
The only large headquarters in the region, the Panama Canal Zone administration, was 
Army-centric and lacked any joint makeup.  Still, the work which eventually led to the 
creation of the Caribbean Defense Command began long before any formal decision was 
made to create such an entity.  On September 11, 1935, Army/Navy policies and 
procedures regarding joint action had been adopted.  These policies would serve as the 
basis for the Joint Army/Navy defense plan which would then be the basis for the 
formation of the Caribbean Defense Command.  According to this plan, military missions 
were to be divided between Army, Navy, and Panama Canal Department Administration 
in the following manner:  
• Army: was to defend the canal from sabotage and hostile attacks.  
• Navy: was to patrol the coastal zone and control and protect shipping therein.  
• Panama Canal Department Administration: was to protect and operate and 
maintain the canal, its adjuncts and appurtenances to ensure continuous service at 
the required levels.68 
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The above policy was based on the idea that the Navy was the first line of defense and 
there was little chance of enemy naval and air attack on the Canal unless the navy first 
failed catastrophically in its mission, or the canal was damaged either by attack or 
sabotage limiting the U.S. fleet to a single ocean.  Military assessments determined that a 
large scale attack on the Panama Canal was unlikely, and increased air range by U.S. 
warplanes made possible by advances in aviation technology made it even less likely.  
The same advances however did increase the possibility of air raids, and the possibility of 
air raids was initially a major concern among the leadership of the CDC.69  Still, although 
the aviation technology of the time could allow for the patrolling of the areas around the 
Canal, it was insufficient to both patrol and protect the entire Caribbean, leaving the task 
of protection to the Navy.   
In order to assist with the task of protection of the region and establish a clear 
ability to both patrol and defend the Caribbean, the Puerto Rico Department was 
established in May, 1939 as an overseas department.  This was a military headquarters 
tasked with a specific portion of the Caribbean.  It was completely separate from the 
Panama Canal Department and subordinate element to the 2nd Army Corps.  The Antilles 
Department was established in a similar manner.  At the time, naval forces stationed in 
the Panama Sea Frontier also had completely different missions and absolutely no 
relationship to those operating in the Antilles Department70  The Puerto Rico Department 
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would remain as a separate department throughout the war, though all of these commands 
would eventually be subordinated under the Caribbean Defense Command.   
 
FIGURE 2: The 10th Naval District on 8 January 1941. 
Source:  An Administrative History of the Caribbean Sea Frontier, RG 548, Stack Area 
B190, Row 1, Box 329, Container 314.7 Military Histories, p. 7. 
On September 5, 1939, the Panama Canal and Canal Zone were put under 
exclusive jurisdiction of commanding general of the Panama Canal Department.  This in 
effect, reduced the role the Governor of the Canal Zone had traditionally enjoyed over the 
area, something that had not even been done during World War I.71  Troops from both the 
                                                          
71.  Franklin D. Roosevelt, Executive Order dated September 5, 1939, Control of the Panama Canal and 
the Canal Zone, RG 548, Stack B190, Compartment 22, Box 305, Folder 376.21, Unity of Command.  
62 
 
Puerto Rico Department and Panama Canal Department were simultaneously augmented 
in size.  By December 31, 1940, the Panama Canal Department troop numbers were 
approximately 27,850.72  Still, the growth of these separate entities was hampered by the 
lack of joint structure.  Naval units at the beginning of 1941 were under the command of 
what was called the 10th naval District which encompassed most of the Caribbean 
including the northern coast of South America (see Figure 2). 
Increasing the size of the forces in the Canal Zone was made more difficult by the 
realization that such enlargement was a double edged sword.  A major problem with 
trying to mobilize the U.S. military to a wartime footing was quite simply that the United 
States was not yet at war, and entry into the war was still not supported by a majority of 
the population.  This made gearing up for war both legally and ethically questionable, as 
well as diplomatically dangerous.  New troops entering the region also had to be 
conditioned and trained in both the logistics of defending the region and surviving in a 
tropical climate.  On July 26, 1940, the nucleus of the General Headquarters U.S. army 
was activated and had responsibility to administer training of field forces.  This nucleus 
was intended only for training and administrations and was not responsible for planning 
for policy decisions.  The need for additional troops for all stations eventually made 
recruiting new service members an increasingly important issue.  On September 16, 
1940, the President signed the selective service act into law and registration began on  
October 16 of the same year. 
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The Roosevelt Administration came to the conclusion that since in time of war 
there would be one commander for the theater, there should also be one commander for 
preparations of the theater prior to war.73  With this in mind, it became evident that unity 
of command was absolutely essential.  Unfortunately, the haphazard way in which the 
Caribbean defenses had so far been established had not included any unity of command.  
The existence of autonomous or later semi-autonomous military units in the region would 
continue to be a stumbling block throughout the war effort, which would ultimately 
complicate the work of the Command.  In fact, the initial idea was for unity of land based 
military command alone.  Adding unity with naval forces was initially “left to a later 
date.”74 
The difficulties in coordinating all these competing issues, especially as they 
related to the Canal, Canal Zone, and Latin America in general, were among the major 
reasons behind the creation of the Caribbean Defense Command.  The Command was 
officially ordered into existence in February of 1941, a full ten months before the Pearl 
Harbor attack.  The CDC was a prototype unified military organization designed to 
defend both the Panama Canal and the Caribbean from Axis aggression.  That this was 
actually done before the Pearl Harbor attack which brought the United States into the war 
was not as unusual as it might first appear.  The United States had been directly or 
indirectly preparing for war for some time, and had acquired and created several military 
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assets for this purpose.  By the terms of a 1940 agreement, the United States had 
delivered fifty outmoded destroyers to the British navy in exchange for several British 
Caribbean bases.  This agreement, aside from assisting Britain by providing much needed 
military hardware, had left the United States with responsibility for several bases spread 
throughout the Caribbean and reinforced the U.S. role in its defense during the conflict.  
It also forced the United States to act strategically to defend its newly acquired bases as 
well as the region that surrounded them.75  The bases from Britain were to be added to 
prior conquests from Spain and purchases from Denmark.  Due to the unsure nature of 
the war, and the possibility of outside influence from occupied nations, the United States 
at first considered the Europeans Axis powers as well as the Japanese as likely threats.76  
Thus, in the plan approved on August 14, 1940, the Caribbean was earmarked as a 
“theater of probable initial operations.”77 
The British bases acquired via trade included five in the Caribbean theater: 
Trinidad, Antigua, St. Lucia, British Guyana, and Jamaica.  As seen in Figure 3, these 
bases were spread throughout the Caribbean, though concentrated toward the South-
Eastern portion which put them some distance from the Panama Canal.  None of these 
bases was in any condition to be put to immediate use, and all needed garrisoning and 
supplies forcing the new command to begin preparing plans to develop, garrison and 
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employ the bases from scratch.  Employment of the bases would be under the direction of 
the War Department General Staff.  The status of foreign military bases in the region was 
of continuing concern however, and the War Department also considered the possible 
necessity of protective occupation of Western Hemisphere European possessions, as well 
as the possible use of armed forces to assist Latin American partner nations in thwarting 
attacks by axis or subversive groups and collaborating with the armed forces of said 
partner nations in joint operations.78 
  
FIGURE 3: Lend Lease Bases. 
Source: An Administrative History of the Caribbean Sea Frontier, RG 548, Stack Area 
B190, Row 1, Box 329, Container 314.7 Military Histories, p. 6.  
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The Roosevelt Administration established the Caribbean Defense Command in 
the hopes of not only defending the waterways, but of establishing a base from which 
American power could be projected throughout the region so as to deter any possible 
hostility.  Establishing such a command proved no easy feat.  No such structure had ever 
been attempted before, and inter-service conflicts and competition had been accepted as a 
common fact of life in military circles. Indeed, the Navy’s resistance to having a flag 
officer (general officer) assigned to the command delayed their full integration into the 
structure until 1942.79  The announcement in early 1941 of the creation of the Caribbean 
Defense Command simply referred to it as a national defense organization for “those 
islands in and bordering on the Caribbean sea, all such parts of French Guiana, 
Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, and Central America less Mexico and the seas adjacent 
thereto as may be required for Army and Navy operations.”  This centralized military 
command was to be the “number one outpost of the United States…and directly 
controlling all sea lane access to the Mexican gulf frontier on the southeast.”  It was 
tasked with guarding the Panama Canal which was simply described as “the vital 
artificial waterway connecting the two oceans.”  By some accounts however, the goal 
was effectively converting Caribbean waters into an American “Mare Nostrum.”80  
Existing plans assumed that any such endeavor would include the help from European 
and Latin American partner nations in securing additional outposts to supplement the 
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ones already established.81  Shortly before U.S. entry into the war, the 10th Naval District 
was converted into the Caribbean Naval Coastal Frontier and separated into three sectors: 
Guantanamo, Puerto Rico, and Trinidad (see Figure 4). 
 
FIGURE 4: The Caribbean Naval Coastal Frontier on 1 July 1941. 
Source: An Administrative History of the Caribbean Sea Frontier, RG 548, Stack Area 
B190, Row 1, Box 329, Container 314.7 Military Histories, p. 9.  
By the time the Caribbean Defense Command was activated, the war had already 
been going on in Europe for sixteen months.  In the time that the United States spent 
preparing for a possible entry into the war, most of Europe had capitulated to the German 
and Italian armies.  Japan had joined the Axis in September 1940 which had virtually 
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guaranteed that U.S. entry into the war would see Americans fighting on two fronts.  
Ironically, the increased danger had not been detrimental to the war effort.  In fact, 
shortly before the attack on Pearl Harbor, U.S. public opinion had already begun to shift 
from strongly opposing any entry into war to grudgingly considering the U.S.’ eventual 
entry into the war inevitable.  Popular opinion had also translated into increased 
legislative support to prepare to meet the danger.82   
The most immediate threats to the Canal were perceived as being sabotage, short 
duration carrier based air raids, and possible tactical incursions. 83  Bombardment from 
the sea, or attacks from land by large expeditionary forces seemed improbable.  It was 
believed projection of force should serve as a deterrent to the more likely forms of attack.  
Due to the lack of air assets in the region and the aviation technology of the day however, 
any defensive plans needed to assume that there would be no quick reinforcements from 
the United States to assist the Canal Zone should the situation turn dire, as even the 
fastest response would still leave the Zone to fend for itself for a protracted amount of 
time.  This meant that plans had to be prepared before entering into any conflict, and had 
to assume any defense needed to be mounted by the troops on the ground with little or no 
relief. 84 
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Early assessments suggested that though a direct invasion by Axis forces was 
unlikely, the use of submarine warfare to disrupt shipping and possibly threaten the Canal 
itself was a real threat as long as control over the Atlantic was not definitely settled.85  It 
was supposed, however, that U.S. armed forces would need to be used to assist the 
American republics to deal with subversive groups sympathetic to the Axis.  This threat 
seemed serious enough that during the bi-lateral military staff conversations in the fall of 
1940, the United States had agreed to provide support to these governments in resisting 
any such attempts.86  The need for unity of command under the circumstances was 
undeniable, as was the need to establish a unified command in a central area within the 
region itself.  The Panama Canal Zone was chosen as the location for the command not 
only for its strategic significance, but with an eye toward establishing easy and regular 
contact with representatives from the southern republics.87    
The process of running the Caribbean Defense Command was a particularly 
complex one, made even more so by the already complicated relationship between the 
military in the Canal Zone and the nation of Panama.  During the construction of the 
Canal, after losing several key figures, President Theodore Roosevelt had decided on 
putting Lieutenant Colonel George Goethals, a member of the Army Corps of Engineers 
in charge of the project.  Aside from the obvious experience Goethals had with creating 
and maintaining waterways, his position in active service for the Army meant that he 
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could not simply quit his job the way the previous two head engineers had, but would 
have to remain at his post until recalled by the President.88  This move set a precedent for 
the governor of the Canal Zone to traditionally be a member of the Army.   
The establishment of the Caribbean Defense Command threw a new wrinkle into 
this arrangement, as the commanding general of the Caribbean Defense Command 
needed unity of command in order to fulfill his duties.  Because of the way the Caribbean 
Defense Command had been established however, the commander enjoyed unity of 
command, where it related to the actual Canal Zone, only in his capacity as commander 
of the Panama Canal Department, and not by virtue of his position as commander of the 
Caribbean Defense Command.  Though in many cases, this was a “distinction without a 
difference,” it began to cause several unexpected consequences as the war moved on due 
to the regimented nature of military operations.  In particular, though the Caribbean 
Defense Command commander was nominally in charge of the Antilles Department, it 
meant that his dealings with this department could only be done through Caribbean 
Defense Command personnel instead of the more numerous Canal Zone personnel, 
causing manpower problems as the number of troops was reduced toward the end of the 
war.89  Unity of command had already been identified as a major contributor in the 
success of the Caribbean Defense Command in maintaining security over the region, and 
discussions were ongoing in maintaining the status quo after the war was over.  In fact, in 
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a detailed discussion of the issue which attempted to list advantages and disadvantages of 
maintaining or expanding the Caribbean Defense Command structure after the war, the 
only disadvantage listed by the study was the possible resentment it might cause among 
the Panamanian people who were “suspicious and resentful of military domination.”90 
Not surprisingly, the first year of operation of the Caribbean Defense Command 
was the most hectic, yet in a way, also the most successful.  Although countless logistical 
challenges had to be met, the very quick establishment of a functioning command 
structure allowed the Caribbean Defense Command to set the precedent for the viability 
of such an enterprise.  The first year was also one of increasing growth and staffing-
because as the United States quickly began gearing up for total war, the CDC was 
initially given as much support as possible.   
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CHAPTER 3: 1942, Rapid Growth 
 
1942 was arguably the busiest year for the Caribbean Defense Command and its assigned 
area of responsibility as an active theater of war.  Although defense of the Canal 
remained the top priority for the Command, the need to protect both military and 
commercial shipping became a major concern around this time.  Although the war was 
initially understood to be against Japan, the command was notified via Official Telegraph 
on December 11, 1941 that the United States was also at war with Germany and Italy.91  
This meant that the German U-Boats that were known to be in the region were now fair 
targets, but also that they would likely begin hostilities.   By late 1941, enemy submarines 
had been forced away from the European Coastal Waters by extensive bombardment air 
patrols and were seeking targets in new fields of attack.  The amount of supplies and raw 
materials from South America which passed through the Canal was a temptingly 
underdefended target.  Upon U.S. entry into the war, German submarine packs began 
infiltrating sea lanes along the eastern U.S. and Caribbean region, which proved to be 
easy targets.  In 1941, one in five ships was lost to enemy submarines in the Caribbean.  
German submarine activity became particularly prevalent in the “Trinidad sector,” which 
remained a weak link in the chain of defense of the region.92   
Fortunately, decision makers in the United States had anticipated this possibility.  
From 1940 to December 7, 1941, preparations and plans had already been made for 
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foreseeable action or threat against the Canal itself.93  Plans for Canal defense had not 
however, extended to defense of the entire region, so the dual assignment of the 
Caribbean Defense Command had not been as extensively planned out as Canal defense 
strategies.  The lead up to the U.S. entry into the war further complicated the logistical 
situation by giving the United States control over the British Caribbean bases which it 
had received in exchange for war matériel (the Lend-Lease bases).  The acquisition of 
new bases added to the possible defensive positions which could be used, but also 
became a major burden on the already limited resources afforded to the Command.  
Supplying such bases was a major logistical impairment, and manning them was equally 
difficult due to standard military rotation cycles, where most CDC assignments were less 
than a year in length.94  Moreover, the United States was not initially prepared to deal 
with an opponent pressing aggressive submarine attacks, and in many cases the 
Command had to learn as it went along and rely on the extensive experience of its 
European partners, particularly Britain in dealing with such assaults.   
Following a brazen attack (described in more detail later) which caught the region 
by surprise, the Command also had to take into account not only military matters, but 
matters of international politics.  The attack, though relatively insignificant when 
compared to the kind of violence being experienced in the European and African 
continents, seemed to shake the entire region and ultimately influenced the creation of 
stronger ties between the CDC and the local governments.  This aided in the mission of 
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keeping Axis influence from reaching the Western Hemisphere, and diminishing it where 
it already existed.  The idea of an Axis presence in the region was also of major concern 
to the United States, and to the CDC.  Throughout 1942, it became clear that Axis 
influence had indeed extended to the region, though not necessarily to the strength that 
many had initially feared.  The clear signs of existing Axis activity throughout South 
America only helped to increase the tension within the theater and continued to be a 
source of concern to the Command until late in the war.  In early 1942, the three sectors 
that made up the Caribbean Sea Frontier were once again redrawn to more or less the 
shape they would maintain through the end of the war (see Figure 5).  
 
FIGURE 5: The Caribbean Sea Frontier, 19 April 1942. 
Source: An Administrative History of the Caribbean Sea Frontier, RG 548, Stack Area 
B190, Row 1, Box 329, Container 314.7 Military Histories, p. 23. 
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The year 1942 proved to be a high point for tension and activity throughout the 
region, and for the Command.  Developments during this year established several trends 
that would help define the Command going forward.  On a positive side these trends 
included increased unity of command among joint forces, increased professionalism in 
handling of the submarine threat, improved training programs, and increasingly positive 
relations with the other nations of the region.  Several negative patterns also emerged, 
however, including such problems as continued difficulty in inter-service cooperation, a 
continuing though eventually diminishing threat of losses due to enemy action, and more 
importantly, a continued shortage of men and matériel which would hamper the 
command throughout its existence.  The latter of these also led to a pattern of continuous 
change in tactics and organization to overcome shortages and deficiencies which made 
for a lack of consistency in operational procedures. Ironically, by the end of the year, the 
successes of the command along with positive developments in the war abroad actually 
led to the realization that the Command had to be reduced even further in personnel, 
which would be a process that would take up the initial portions of the following year.  
Toward the end of 1942, the Command experienced its first change of command, and the 
new commander would face significantly different challenges than his predecessor had. 
The United States’ rather abrupt entry into the war following the Pearl Harbor 
attack led to the activation of all the initial plans for defense of the Canal, and for the 
activation of the Caribbean Defense Command into proper war footing.  Although not 
universal, support for the U.S. war effort was initially very high throughout the region.  
As early as December 7, 1941, Nicaragua became the first Central American nation to 
offer assistance by placing all their territory including land, water, and air at the service 
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of the United States for as long as conflict between the United States and the Axis 
existed. Managua and Puerto Cabezas became the first airports operated by U.S. army 
personnel for use by U.S. aircraft.95  Though few expected a major land or sea invasion 
into the region, it was considered possible that Axis forces might decide to attack the 
Canal or the region through the use of infiltrators or other subversive tactics, as well as 
using more discreet military assets such as submarines.  The Trinidad sector was 
eventually revealed to be one of the major weaknesses in the anti-submarine program and 
losses increased to one in four in this region.96   
The very different relationships the United States enjoyed with the governments 
of the region played a big part in the CDC’s ability to deal with such threats.  British 
possessions were much easier to deal with when it came to possible espionage activity.  
One possible leakage incident, for instance, was dealt with early on by instituting a strong 
censorship program after which there were no further events.  Unfortunately, relations 
were not as good in other areas.  Continuing animosity toward U.S. personnel following 
racial incidents in Toledo, Brazil early in the war forced the U.S. War Department --
which was attempting to censor mail going to and from U.S. personnel in the region-- to 
forego using local postal services and use U.S. Army mail exclusively.  Though this 
proved to be an effective method to avoid leakages, it was an additional burden on an 
already stretched military bureaucracy.  More troubling than any of these, however, was 
the situation of possible collaboration by subversive elements in the Trinidad sector 
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which included French Guiana.  The Governor of French Guiana was suspected of 
furnishing goatskins full of oil to use in making diversionary oil slicks for hiding German 
U-Boats, though military Intelligence was never able to substantiate this assertion.  With 
Spain neutral during the war, though suspected of Axis sympathies, Spanish ships were 
also suspected of refueling German Submarines due to their continuous suspicious and 
erratic behavior in the region.97  
Overall support for the United States within the region had been strong since the 
Pearl Harbor Attack, but as with all alliances, there were gaps.  In January 1942, an 
emergency inter-American meeting had been held in Rio de Janeiro which had failed to 
establish a binding commitment and instead produced a weak resolution encouraging the 
various governments to break off relations with the Axis.  At that time, it was simply not 
clear who would win the war, and several countries with traditionally strong ties to 
Germany and Italy (notably, Chile, Argentina, and to some extent Brazil) were reluctant 
to risk these relationships by taking the wrong side.98  Meanwhile, the increasingly bold 
Axis submarine attacks continued to be a growing concern throughout the region.   Not 
only were they threatening military assets, but they were also causing a great deal of 
logistical damage to the war effort as well as loss of life.  In June 1942, a Colombian 
Navy Schooner, the ARC Resolute was torpedoed, and the U-boat crew proceeded to 
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machine-gun the survivors in the water.99  These attacks did not have to target military 
equipment directly in order to be effective.  On August 1942, for instance, another 
Colombian Schooner was sunk by an Axis submarine preventing the Colombian 
Government from being able to transport goods between the mainland and their base at 
St. Andrews Archipelago.100  Brazil was similarly on the receiving end of Axis 
aggression which turned it decidedly toward the U.S. side by the end of the year.101  
Panama, which had experienced a coup in October 1941 that brought a new president 
more agreeable to U.S. cooperation, had quickly declared war on the Axis and began 
detaining citizens of Axis nations.  Similar actions along with a program of strict 
censorship and tight security virtually eliminated any Axis intelligence activities in 
Panama. 102 
Despite the overall trend toward pro-U.S. cooperation, several developments 
caused worries that collaboration with the Axis by populations within the region might 
continue.  According to a May 1942 Report, a German U-boat was once spotted in the 
mouth of Rio Cassipore, Brazil, and the natives reported having sold supplies to a 
German at night.  Such reports led the allies to believe there might be a hidden submarine 
base in the area.  On Isla Maraca located in the mouth of Lake Maracaibo, Venezuela, 
signs of “probable Axis collaboration” were also noted.  Other suspicious maritime 
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activity included a camouflaged airfield and coastal fires burning with no apparent 
reason, as well as sea planes attached to the French ship Jeanne D’arc which came and 
went quickly at suspicious times and intervals.  There was also constant signaling via 
lights from small ships and the shore visible along the coast of Venezuela.103  The 
problem was not a purely foreign one, as a possible leakage incident involving U.S. 
Naval personnel was later suspected of having contributed to an attack on Aruba which 
had taken place the day the U.S. forces landed ashore.  It was learned that the Merchant 
Marines had somehow become aware of the planned date for this landing.  Though it was 
never definitively proven that this leakage incident had influenced the attack, it 
demonstrated the seriousness of even small information leakages.104 
Paranoia had begun to grip the region leading to the responses to perceived or 
suspected enemy activity consuming valuable resources.  Sometimes, the presence of real 
hostilities was enough to convince many that some of their more elaborate suspicions 
may be true.  For instance, the same day as the first major attack in the region, 
information about refueling German submarines at Mara, French Guiana was received.  
Despite close air patrols, no definite information regarding a submarine base in French 
Guiana could be confirmed, but suspicions led the Department of War to request that 
Pan-Am commercial pilots flying nearby re-route to fly over the suspected area and 
report back.  A month later, a U.S. observer was able to enter the area and reported back 
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that there were no facilities available which could be used for such purposes.105  The 
whole affair had been a case of overblown suspicions in an understandably nervous 
region.  Indeed, regardless of U.S. suspicions about Axis presence in the northern coast of 
South America, the United States was actually able to effectively use French Guiana 
airfields for Anti-submarine activities.106  More importantly however, the initial attacks 
helped illustrate just how vulnerable the region was in case of a coordinated attack and 
possibly helped dissuade some holdouts about the necessity of working with the United 
States.  Immediately following the attacks, Peru had requested U.S. assistance in 
preventing similar attacks including a list of matériel so large that the CDC recommended 
use of the existing lend-lease program.107   
The U.S. Anti-submarine program initially depended on British Royal Air Force 
(RAF) officers with experience in dealing with German U-Boats.  From these experts, 
several important lessons were learned which would play a role in developing effective 
procedures.  According to RAF plans that had been disseminated through the Department 
of the Navy, there were several different ways of dealing with submarines.  Bombing 
submarines directly was only effective for subs which were visible on the surface or 
within fifteen seconds after submergence, but if release of the bomb did not show definite 
proof of destruction within a reasonable time, continued patrol of the area was still 
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recommended.  According to RAF records such bombing proved 90% effective, and the 
continued patrolling from first contact to ten hours later proved successful in twenty two 
recorded cases with an average of four depth charges per kill.  Alternatively, the record of 
dropping the bomb after fifteen seconds of submergence had only proven to be 1% 
effective, but the RAF had found that fixed cannons in aircraft had the ability to damage 
submarines to the extent that they had to go in for repairs.   Such damage to craft which 
were at a distance from friendly bases placed them in hazardous conditions and left them 
vulnerable to attack.  Front mounted guns on airplanes, however, were found to be even 
better offensive weapons. Such plans were dependent on having adequate numbers of 
bombs, planes, and ships disposable for the effort, which was not the case at the 
Caribbean Defense Command, so plans needed to do as good a job as possible with the 
existing resources. 108   
Partly due to these restrictions, it was decided that an Anti-submarine program 
could not solely attempt to find and destroy enemy submarines, as the relative ease with 
which these could avoid such efforts would render such an endeavor a waste of valuable 
resources.  The overall plan then, also included ample use of coastal artillery.   Aside 
from denying enemy surface craft approach, the purpose of coastal artillery placements 
was also to serve double duty and protect minefields as well.  A Harbor Entrance 
Command Post (HECP) was established to give control of all passage to Army and Naval 
personnel through the Canal and its accessways.  Some fixed harbor defense batteries 
were assigned dual duty of defending against motor torpedo boats and submarines.  
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Islands along the Antilles were also garrisoned with 90mm (Anti-Aircraft) batteries in the 
dual role of anti-Aircraft and Anti-Submarine defense as part of the strengthening of the 
“steel ring” around the canal. 109   
The U.S. Navy was officially in charge of Anti-submarine operations and thus 
was in charge of anti-submarine training.  The training took the form of having a friendly 
submarine simulate various submarine “signs” such as sending out an oil slick, travelling 
with a periscope just barely breaking the water, or submerging rapidly.  These maneuvers 
were used to train anti-submarine personnel on what to look out for.  Due to the standard 
rotation of personnel within the Command, this became routine training for incoming 
personnel.  Despite training, however, the task of successfully identifying submarines 
based on such signs remained a difficult one, so a major point of training for incoming 
personnel was also knowing and identifying likely paths that submarines would take.110  
All Caribbean Air Force Units had to submit anti-submarine reports to the Commander in 
Chief U.S. Fleet through the CDC.  This included the Caribbean Coastal Air Force and 
Antilles Department.  This coordination had the effect of making common use of 
methods of strategy by compiling information from all allied nations.111  It was also 
however a possible bottleneck in the flow of information which would have unexpected 
consequences on at least one occasion.  
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All the preparations leading to establishing an effective steel ring against Axis 
submarines were in place surprisingly quickly after the U.S. entry into the war, a 
testament to the quality of the pre-war planning and to the efficiency of those involved.  
By December 20, 1941, General Johnson had asked that bombers being assigned to the 
Command include as many large B24s as possible in order to perform deep sea patrol 
work “necessitated by shortage of naval patrol bombers,” and on December 22, 1941, the 
Panama Air Task Force was created under the supervision of the CDC.112  Shortages in 
the number of available planes, however, made it clear that the well-designed plans that 
had been created for the defense of the command before the war did not stand a 
reasonable likelihood of being implemented.   
On January 4, 1942, bomber command submitted a much more modest plan based 
on available equipment. These revised plans requested patrolling a distance of only 600 
miles from Talara in north-western Peru to the Galapagos Islands and back.   This would 
consist of B-17s based in Talara and B-17s from Guatemala conducting two patrols per 
day.  There would be three such patrols requiring 37 B-17s and 14 PBYs for a total of 51 
vessels in all, but if these were to continue for a prolonged period it would require three 
times as many planes.  There would be no night-time coverage but at dusk an estimated 
sweep of 15 planes at Talara, 10 in Guatemala, and 14 in Galapagos would increase the 
required planes for continuous operations.  Both the new plans and the people 
implementing them implicitly accepted that there would be holes in coverage until more 
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planes became available.113  In early 1942, blackout operations were put into effect in the 
Trinidad sector and anti-aircraft and harbor defenses were manned around the clock and 
“close coordination of civil and military defense measures was affected.”  Radar stations 
were established. Coverage grew increasingly effective until submarine activity 
dissipated.  All these measures were by necessity kept secret.114   
On January 17, 1942, Flights B and C of the 59th Bombardment squadron began 
their assignment in Aruba and Curaçao using six of the available eleven A-20As-for the 
double duty of submarine patrol and escort duty.  Due to the inadequacy of naval assets 
in the region, a recommendation was made to send the 25th Bomb Group and 27th Recon 
squadron to Panama to increase their capabilities. This was not the only instance of 
resources being shifted around.  Shortly after the attack on Aruba, the Puerto Rico, 3rd 
pursuit squadron sent planes there to augment their forces after the attack. 115  
In one of the earliest examples of the joint inter-service nature that would define 
the command, in February 1942, HECP installations were approved and installed so that 
Navy forces could operate jointly with the Army.  General Marshall had actually 
approved these installations back on June 23, 1941, but they were not installed until after 
the U.S. entry into the war. The purpose of HECP was to act as a localized intelligence 
section to disseminate information of activities in defense sea areas and take decisive 
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action to “operate elements of harbor defense against the enemy in those defensive 
coastal areas.” CDC leadership came to realize the necessity of having American 
Garrisons to protect unprotected harbors in the Caribbean as sinkings by submarines 
increased.  These parts included Puerto Barios, Guatemala, where the army Air Forces set 
up a field along the route from Miami to Panama.116  For the most part, until that first 
major series of attacks, the situation remained tense, but there was little actual activity.  
An incident on February 7, 1942 was typical of the happenings, when an enemy 
submarine was spotted but upon further investigation it turned out to be a false alarm.  On 
February 13, 1942, U.S. bombers were sent to attack a submarine being engaged by the 
U.S. Destroyer Goff, northeast of Jamaica but were unable to find it.117  Nevertheless, 
planners believed that a major rise in activity was likely, and for the most part they 
proved to be justified in this assessment.  
The first major hostile operation of the war within the CDC AOR occurred on 
February 16, 1942 and despite the relative insignificance of the action when compared to 
the entirety of the war effort, it made a lasting impression in the region.  At 0711 hours, a 
visiting staff officer in Aruba reported enemy submarine action causing an anti-
submarine patrol to be dispatched to the area.  The SS Mongagus was also reported as 
being fired on, and Axis submarines attacked merchant ships and shelled a refinery on 
Aruba.  A U-Boat fired a torpedo into the U.S.S Perdernales and SS Orangestad while 
they were at anchor in San Nicolas Harbor.  Both ships were lost.  Shelling of the refinery 
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also hit a nearby school but fortunately caused no loss of life.  As there was no way to tell 
if this was a coordinated attack or the work of a single U-Boat, the response was 
understandably ineffective.  By the time the B18As were sent out, they sighted a 
submarine but dropped no bombs.  Another submarine was bombed but damage was 
estimated as being negligible.  The final summary of the attack described the biggest 
weakness in the response as being the lack of notification.  The submarine doing the 
shelling would have been an easy target to retaliate against with enough time to respond.  
Lack of depth charges was also an issue as the planes were forced to rely on 300lb 
demolition bombs which were not designed to attack submarines.118   
The following day, a submarine, possibly the same one as from the previous day’s 
attack once again surfaced near the airport and it once again submerged immediately.  
Speculation was that it might be trying to gather information on the aircraft in the field to 
relay back to their command.  Shipping dropped “noticeably” after this second incident, 
demonstrating the amount of damage that a single submarine could conceivably 
accomplish.  The entire island of Aruba was completely blacked out though there were 
reports of suspicious lights spotted intermittently from prominent peaks.  The lights were 
speculated to be either Axis agents, infiltrators, or fifth columnists sending signals. One 
morning a few days later, while still reeling from the previous activities, shell fire was 
heard over the Largo refinery. It was later determined that these were actually fired from 
the U.S. Destroyer Winslow.  The shelling caused very little damage but three planes took 
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off to cover the area and bombed an enemy submarine they spotted, though there was no 
way of knowing how much damage they caused. 119 
 
FIGURE 6: U.S. Personnel manning Coastal Artillery. 
Source:  Pictorial Archives of United States Southern Command, SOUTHCOM Archives. 
Following the Aruba attack, the CDC conducted an extensive study of the coastal 
defenses which brought to light a longstanding debate regarding placing heavy 
armaments at the bases of both canal harbors (upgrading existing guns).  One difficulty 
with creating coastal artillery positions was that these were in hard to reach tropical 
locations as seen in Figure 6.  The need to have these positions continuously manned 
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would mean exposing U.S. service personnel to extreme conditions in remote areas for 
prolonged periods of time.  For this reason it was preferred to put coastal artillery 
positions in areas that were either closer to civilization or easily reachable.  Upon 
examination of these plans, engineering reports suggested that the rocks in many of the 
proposed areas were so unstable that creating the necessary fortifications would be 
prohibitively expensive as it would require not only building the defenses, but also 
facilities for stationing personnel around the clock.  Eventually a suggestion to put large 
37mm Anti-aircraft guns in place at the gate ends or on nearby barges at the breakwaters 
entrance was approved, but it was contingent on availability.   
Another problem encountered dealt with the vast difference in terrain between the 
two different coasts.  The Pacific side of the Canal was geologically very different from 
the Atlantic side and needed vastly different solutions to the same problem.  On the 
Pacific side, the existing minefield caused the problem of attempting to deploy coastal 
defenses from a great distance.  Large 75mm guns were recommended for protection.120 
Attacks on merchant vessels continued following these incidents.  After the war it 
was learned that the successes by the Axis in early incursions had led to an intensification 
of submarine activity in the area. In short, the uncoordinated and weak initial response 
had acted as an encouragement to the enemy, and it was later estimated that there were 
only eight to ten enemy submarines operating in the area.   Ironically, this uptick in 
activity laid the groundwork for its eventual diminution.  The initial attacks, as noted, 
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rattled the region enough to help consolidate cooperation with the United States by 
several holdouts in Latin America.  Venezuela for instance, immediately granted the 
United States informal permission to use their airfields and bases for use against enemy 
submarines in Aruba and Curaçao, and Dutch authorities allowed their forces to be placed 
under U.S. control   It also forced the CDC to increase their coordination with their more 
remote subordinate commands and soon thereafter, the U.S. Army and Navy “effected a 
unity of command under the senior naval officer for all the United States forces in the 
Aruba Curaçao Area.”121 
Submarine activity was by far the biggest concern toward the beginning of 1942, 
but concerted enemy action was also a big fear.  A memorandum dated February 3 from 
Colonel William Walker outlined a theoretical attack by a Japanese task force consisting 
of aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines.  The final assessment of the 
exercise was simply that the Canal and its waterways were susceptible to attack, and that 
it was necessary to bring in both additional heavy bombers and experienced personnel to 
operate them.122  By February 28, 1942, submarine activity had grown to the point that 
10% of shallow draft tankers operating out of Maracaibo, Venezuela to Aruba had been 
sunk.  It became clear that neither overflights to engage enemy subs, nor coastal defenses 
would be enough to deal with the continued attacks, so a regular convoy system with 
routed traffic lanes near coasts of Central America was inaugurated to help protect 
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Caribbean shipping.123  The convoy system sought to make efficient use of planes 
available by assigning them dual duty of convoy protection and submarine search.  Their 
radius of coverage was five to twenty-five miles from the center of the ship formation, 
depending on visibility, each plane maintaining a 1500 yard distance unless recognition 
signals were exchanged.  This latter precaution was to ensure protection against hostile 
aircraft which might accompany a submarine pack.  Convoy planes maintained various 
altitudes, both to prevent collision and to allow the pilot to give his attention to submarine 
search instead of worrying about the placements of other nearby aircraft.  The last patrol 
before nightfall covered a radius of thirty miles with special attention given to the flanks 
and areas astern.124  
The coastal defenses were also determined to be insufficient for the actual threat 
posed by the subs, leading to efforts to increase the coastal defenses to areas not directly 
controlled by the United States.  Fortunately, the newfound cooperation brought about by 
increased sub activity was a major aid in this respect.  On March 11,1942, Major P.W. 
Edwards, an assistant to the Assistant Chief of Staff G3, went to Guatemala to make a 
study of defense needs there.  Following the visit, he recommended a minimum of two 
batteries of 75mm guns, three seacoast search lights, and eight machine guns (four for 
each battery) all with the necessary ammunition and wire communications.  He added 
provisions for additional 155MM gun batteries should shipping in the area increase.  
Interestingly, Edwards also recommended that Guatemala participate in the defense of 
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this portion of their territory themselves, indicating not only a willingness by the United 
States to rely on its newfound partners, but also a surprising degree of confidence in their 
abilities.125 
There were still several growing pains ranging from both lack of material and lack 
of coordination and training.  One problem was the constant reworking of responsibilities 
for portions of the air campaign based on available resources and mixed abilities.  On 
April 10, 1942, for instance, a special Task Force was established to patrol between Cape 
Mala and the northern limit of the Gulf of Panama and Jaque point at the southern limit, 
but it eventually had to be discontinued at General Andrew’s decision in favor of the 
Panama Air Task Force organization which proved to be better suited to this.  This small 
logistical issue, paled in comparison to more serious training issues.  Illustrative of these 
issues was an incident occurring on April 20, 1942 when the U.S. Submarine Flying Fish 
was attacked by a plane of the 74th Bombardment Squadron based in Guatemala which 
had gone on a regular anti-submarine patrol before receiving reports of friendly 
submarines in the area. Upon spotting the Flying Fish, and with no word of any friendly 
submarine movements, the pilot attacked.  Fortunately, the attack was unsuccessful and 
“little or no damage was done.”  However, the incident helped to stress to pilots the 
importance of strict adherence to standard procedures, and to the Navy the importance of 
being prompt in reporting of friendly vessels movements.126  It may also have illustrated 
how ineffective many such attacks could be.  Though largely dealt with through training, 
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friendly fire incidents continued throughout 1942.  As late as  August 21, the S-17, an old 
World War I vintage Submarine surfaced in the outer harbor of Balboa but failed to 
display colors as required in unrestricted waters.  The command officer of the 45th 
Bombardment Squadron dropped four bombs which straddled the submarine causing 
damage that took seven days of repair work to fix.  A subsequent investigation cited the 
submarine for carelessness, and the Air Corps personnel for being “over-eager” in 
attacking the submarine too fast without allowing it time to recognize their mistake and 
fly their colors.127   
From March to June 1942, 173 ships were sunk in the Caribbean by German 
submarines with the rate increasing until August 1942.  These ranged from merchant to 
military vessels.  By this point, the Command was becoming more aggressive and 
effective in their defense of the region.  The increased effectiveness toward the end of the 
year along with positive turns of events in the war caused the submarine attacks to begin 
to taper off.128  Axis U-boat activity was highest in the Trinidad sector making this the 
weak link in the “steel ring” of protection around the canal.  The area was both physically 
and politically complicated.  It “dipped into and embedded itself into South America,” 
but also required coordination with four different nations due to encompassing British, 
French, Dutch, and Venezuelan land and waters.  Additionally, due to the different 
terrains that needed to be covered, protection of the areas had to be distributed among 
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several different service groups (Army for land protection, Army Air Corps for airfields, 
and Navy for the waterways).129 
At around the same time that the command’s effectiveness was finally making a 
dent in the continued submarine attacks, General Marshall directed the organization of 
the 1st anti-submarine air command, whose mission was to destroy hostile submarines.130  
This would be controlled by the War Department and would be stationed first to patrol 
the Atlantic coastal waters, especially those of the Gulf of Mexico. There were problems 
in setting it up however, which would not be resolved until March 1943 following a 
conference in Miami with representatives from Antisubmarine Command, WDGS, 7th 
Naval District, Operations Division, CDC, and the Caribbean Sea frontier which resulted 
in the establishment of San Julian and San Antonio bases as the center of the anti-
submarine command’s activities in the Gulf.131  Nevertheless, that same month, a 
possible submarine sighting rattled a convoy when an escort pilot reported observing an 
unidentified submarine towing a dinghy which was speculated to be used to transport 
submarine personnel ashore.132  Upon further analysis, absence of any definite 
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identification or physical evidence led to questions about the reliability of the report, 
pointing to the continuing paranoia regarding such activity that still existed in the region.   
Unity of command continued to be a major problem even after this was settled as 
naval anti-Submarine units within the Caribbean Sea Frontier were under command of 
Commander Caribbean Naval Sea Frontier, not under the direct command of the 
Commander, CDC.  This situation continued until July 1943, when the 10th Fleet was 
established.133  Until this time, CDC responsibility was to provide Army air units on 
request to be used in joint operations.  It was then determined by the Secretary of War 
that recon capabilities in the outer Atlantic were “meager” in comparison to those of the 
Pacific theater, which prompted LTG Andrews to recommend acquiring “bombardment 
aviation equipped with radar detector sets for the interception and destruction of all 
enemy naval vessels,” to act as the primary weapon of opposition to any sea threat in the 
Caribbean. Military intelligence also demonstrated the need for additional coastal 
batteries in Venezuela but such were not received until much later (April 1943) as part of 
an anti-submarine defense armament arranged under lend-lease agreement.134 
Nevertheless, anti-submarine assets continued to mount and by November 1942, a 
new sea plane base was partially completed at Cotrino, Nicaragua despite lacking any 
formal agreements signed prior to construction.  It was garrisoned by a detachment of 
185 men to guard against submarine bombardment, surface raid, or any other types of 
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action.135  By this point however, submarine reports for the Caribbean area already 
showed an appreciable decline of hostile submarines present in the waters.  Eight 
submarines were known to have been in the area, counting those entering and leaving the 
operational limits of the Caribbean Sea Frontier: four near Trinidad, one near Aruba, two 
near Puerto Rico, and one near Guantanamo.136   
The ultimate expansion of the Caribbean Defense Command as originally 
planned, never fully developed.  This was attributable partly to the Command’s ability to, 
after a few fits and starts, effectively deal with the submarine threat to the region.  
Ironically the reduced submarine threat that these efforts had produced gave decision 
makers the impression that the region was not under heavy threat and this weighed in 
their funding and sourcing decisions in contrast to the very immediate needs of units 
operating elsewhere in the war.   It also was due to the favorable turn in the war 
following the U.S. led invasion of Africa in 1942 (Operation Torch, November 8, 1942) 
which redefined the conflict and diminished the importance of the Caribbean theater.137  
By the end of 1942, it had become apparent that CDC staff had to be reduced, and a new 
organizational chart with 100 less personnel was submitted (though it was not approved 
by the War Department until March 25, 1943).138  November 1942 also saw LTG George 
Brett succeed LTG Frank Andrews, who had led the command through its first volatile 
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years.139   LTG Brett’s tenure at the Caribbean Defense Command would prove to be 
quite different from that of his predecessor who had been mostly concerned with ramping 
up the command and bringing it to something approaching full capacity, while always 
fighting for additional resources in a resource limited atmosphere.  Due to reductions in 
both manpower and activity, LTG Brett would spend much of his time working on 
political-military relations with Latin American nations.  Ironically, this proved very 
fruitful in the long run.140 
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CHAPTER 4: 1943, Peaking and Reorganization 
 
When General George Brett succeeded General Andrews toward the end of 1942, he 
inherited a command that had grown quickly from its inception and was in many ways at 
its peak.  Yet, by this time it was universally understood that the command would be 
changing significantly under its new commander.  Diminishing Axis activity made it 
clear that the threat to the Caribbean region would be minimal and the likelihood of the 
war spreading to the AOR was minimal as well.  Meanwhile, the progress of the war in 
Europe and Africa was putting a major strain on resources.  Lack of activity in the 
Caribbean led to the Caribbean Defense Command being downgraded repeatedly and re-
structured several times throughout 1943.141   
As part of these reorganizations, throughout 1943 to the first part of 1944, the 
Caribbean Defense Command’s mission shifted, which inevitably led to increased chain 
of command issues. 142 Due to force reductions, and partly due to his own character and 
preferences, the new commander spent much of his time working on political-military 
relations with Latin American nations rather than purely military issues. 143  In the long 
run, Brett’s assignment to the post proved to be a fruitful development for the command 
as the CDC would come to be seen as a useful venue for communications and interaction 
with the United States by its southern allies as well as U.S. planners. 
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Of the four commanders that the Caribbean Defense Command had in its brief 
existence, General Brett was quite possibly the one most responsible for turning it into 
what it and its successor commands would eventually become- vehicles for diplomacy 
and military cooperation with the nations of their AOR.  George Brett was an Army Air 
Officer and had experience with dealing with assorted personalities competing in 
different services in difficult circumstances and resource limited situations.  Despite 
having once been described as “…a rather easy-going Air Force officer, who was 
probably a better flier than administrator,” he eventually proved to be a rather gifted 
diplomat.144  More importantly, Brett had first-hand experience in dealing with larger 
than life personalities, personal egos, and political posturing, all of which would serve 
him well in the region.  In fact, it was partly due to his experiences in such issues that he 
had ended up as Commander of the Caribbean Defense Command to begin with.  
Brett’s appointment to the Caribbean Defense Command came following some 
unpleasantness that occurred in the Pacific theater after he rather famously (and 
unintentionally) rankled one of the most enigmatic and storied officers in American 
history, General Douglas MacArthur.  Brett was in command of U.S. forces in Australia 
when the Philippines had surrendered to the Japanese and Washington had ordered 
MacArthur to head to Australia to become Supreme Allied Commander in the Pacific.   
The order to evacuate the Philippines had personally riled MacArthur, who felt it gave 
the appearance that he had lost a battle, in his opinion through no fault of his own.  Brett, 
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as commander of U.S. forces in Australia would in effect be ceding his position as 
highest ranking officer in the region to MacArthur once the latter arrived.  Unfortunately, 
he was also in charge of arranging MacArthur’s transportation to Australia.  Though not 
being directly told the true importance of the transport mission he was to arrange for 
reasons of security, Brett was savvy enough to figure out whose safety he was 
responsible for.  Knowing that MacArthur was not fond of flying and would not ride in 
anything but the best aircraft, he tried to arrange for the best possible aircraft the Army 
had at their disposal, a B17 bomber.  These were in short supply as few had made it back 
from Java, and the few new ones being sent from the United States were assigned to a 
Navy unit whose commander initially refused his request to borrow some for the mission.   
Of the four B-17s Brett was able to secure to ferry MacArthur and his party 
(which included his family), two were laid out due to mechanical problems and were 
unable to make the trip, and one ran out of fuel midflight en-route to pick up MacArthur 
forcing the pilot to ditch and costing the life of two crewmembers.145  The single B-17 
that arrived and was available to make the trip was an older, very worn unit with an 
inexperienced crew.  MacArthur flat out refused to ride in the aircraft.  The ever irascible 
MacArthur, already in a foul mood over being ordered to retreat, took personal offence 
and assumed animosity on Brett’s part for being replaced as commander in Australia.  
Although four new B-17s were eventually secured for the flight, the damage had been 
done.  Right before arriving in Melbourne, MacArthur had already sent a formal request 
to have Brett removed from the theater and took an early opportunity to disrespect Brett 
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by refusing to let him ride in the same vehicle and then refusing to see him for a meeting 
after keeping him waiting for quite a while.  In fact, MacArthur did not meet Brett until 
eight days after arriving in Australia, which was rather unusual for a commander 
relieving another of command.146 
General Richard K. Sutherland, MacArthur’s Chief of Staff, was also not fond of 
Brett and endeavored to keep the animosity between the two going for many months.  It 
did not help that Brett had made some poor choices in his attempts on who to court 
among the local Australian political elite.  Trying to foresee future relations with the 
Australian government, Brett had openly courted some members of the Conservative 
Party which he believed would prevail in upcoming elections.  When this did not happen, 
the members of the ruling party had then held some resentment toward him.  Fortunately 
for Brett, General George Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff and a fellow VMI graduate, 
was a close friend of his and was reluctant to replace him.  It was partly due to Marshall’s 
influence that MacArthur and Sutherland had to tread carefully in replacing Brett.  
Although MacArthur and Sutherland were eventually successful in getting Brett removed 
from the Pacific theater, it was done without any real suggestion that he had failed in his 
mission.  In fact, though there had been some general dissatisfaction with Brett’s often 
overcautious approach, even MacArthur admitted through all his complaints that Brett 
was “Brilliantly gifted” as well as being “Unquestionably highly qualified as an air 
technician and in air administrative duties of a productive or supply character; he is an 
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unusually hard worker…”147  The backhanded compliment of overly qualified praise was 
probably as far as MacArthur was likely to go.  Upon Brett’s recall to the United States, 
Sutherland signed a decoration certifying the award of the Silver Star by General 
MacArthur to George H. Brett, “For gallantry in action in air reconnaissance in the 
combat zone, Southwest Pacific Area, during the months of May, June and July, 
1942.”148  Brett subsequently returned to the United States where he awaited either a new 
assignment, or possibly a court martial.  General Marshall, however quickly put him at 
ease, and the military preference for not airing dirty laundry, especially in a time of war 
eventually won out, and Brett was informed that he would be taking over the Caribbean 
Defense Command.  Before proceeding to the Caribbean Defense Command in late 1942, 
Brett began a public tour of the United States where he became something of a celebrity 
as a high ranking warrior returning home.   
Brett assumed command at the height of the Caribbean Defense Command’s 
buildup.  Though he did have to deal with various logistical issues, his primary job was as 
Washington’s representative to the governments of the region, where he traveled 
extensively.  Brett was unusually well qualified to take over the Caribbean Defense 
Command.  He was a close friend of General Andrews, meaning there would be no 
conflict between incoming and outgoing commanders as there had been with MacArthur.  
And Brett’s close friendship with General Marshall and contacts in Latin America would 
serve him well throughout his command.  Logistical issues aside, the fact that the 
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Caribbean Defense Command was not currently an active theater of war was an 
additional stroke of luck.  Brett himself had a larger than life personality similar to that of 
MacArthur, though admittedly lacking MacArthur’s hypersensitivity.  He also seemed to 
inherently understand the importance of developing personal friendships with local 
leaders, which would serve him better in Latin America than it had in Australia.  He had 
personally “adopted” a B-17B called the Swoose, as his own private transport plane.  The 
Swoose would fly him around the AOR during most of his time as commander, and he 
was able to use it effectively as a means of propaganda allowing foreign leaders to travel 
with him, and reportedly even allowing the Presidents of Cuba and Nicaragua to fly as 
copilots during “good neighbor” visits.149   
Almost immediately upon arriving at the Caribbean Defense Command, General 
Brett was faced with the type of bargaining and haggling for resources that would 
characterize a good part of his time there.  This was indeed not all in the form of force 
reductions, but in actual loss of facilities.  For instance, in a January 1943 memorandum, 
the commander of the Panama Sea Frontier agreed to the proposed elimination of the 
proposed Navy installations at Salinas and agreed to pass the recommendation on to the 
Department of the Navy.  The recommendation had been initially made for the simple 
reason that only four squadrons had been assigned to this command (the Panama Sea 
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Frontier) which was barely sufficient to man and equip all the existing bases, not to 
mention speculative ones that had not even been completed yet.150  Inherent in such 
reductions was the understanding that the war would proceed without them ever being 
needed.  The lack of personnel was not solely noticed by Brett and his staff.  On January 
8, Major General H.C. Ingles of Army Staff had produced a major study on the 
organization of the Caribbean Theater and recommended among other things that the 
Caribbean Defense Command be discontinued altogether.151  On February 27, 1943, War 
Department Assistant Chief of Staff  Thos T. Handy said to Brett that Ingles’ suggestions 
had been received but could not be accepted in their entirety though he nonetheless 
acknowledged there were “weaknesses that exist in the current system,” which had been 
the major cause of Ingles’ concerns.152  
The state of the command had also become a concern outside of the region, 
culminating in a visit by Col. Eliot Cooke of the office of the Inspector General from 
March 4 to 29, 1943. The inspection found that there was a multiplicity of headquarters 
and overlapping commands, “that could only be justified by the original strategic 
conception of the Caribbean Defense since the strategical (sic) situation changed, a 
material reduction of troops and proposed installations has been effected.  However, the 
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Command and staffs have remained practically intact.”153  Subsequently it became an 
issue of how to adequately reduce not only the number of troops assigned to units under 
the Command, but also the number of personnel assigned to the Command itself.  In 
other words, the headquarters itself would have to undergo reductions in forces and 
streamlining of separate different sub-commands for greater efficiency.   
One of the first changes in the structure of the Command occurred in May 1943, 
when the Puerto Rico Department was changed to include the Trinidad Sector and Base 
Command and became the Antilles Department, thus merging three separate sub-
commands into one.  The 6th Air Force was then split roughly in half with one portion 
being placed in the Antilles Department and becoming Antilles Air Command.  
Concurrent with this change, CDC troop strength was ordered reduced from 
approximately 110,000 to 90,000 by the middle of the following year.154  That the 
Caribbean portion of the Command’s Area of Responsibility was the first to be affected 
by reductions was perhaps no surprise.  Aside from the submarine attacks which had been 
largely dealt with, very little activity had occurred in the Caribbean, and though there 
were still fears that the Canal would present a tempting target, the originally planned 
regional set of Caribbean bases were never finished as there was no need for them.    
In point of fact, there were important assets that needed protection in the region.  
The Canal itself was only one part of a larger transportation complex.  Panamanian 
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railways were an integral part of the transportation hub formed by the Canal.  As noted 
earlier, these railways were actually sophisticated and developed enough to completely 
supplant the Canal in transporting all necessary commerce and matériel, even if the Canal 
had been rendered inoperative (albeit at a higher cost).155  Threats to the railways then 
were as important to deal with as those to the Canal.  It was clear that as far as protection 
activities, the Canal Zone and its accessways were more deserving of resources than the 
Caribbean. Unity of command had also never really been appropriately established over 
the entire Caribbean due to the difficulty in coordinating operations at such a distance 
from Command headquarters in Panama.156 
The changes the Command was undergoing caused unity of command to suffer 
throughout the year.  Many of the reorganizations led to confusion among the sub-
commands as to who was in charge of what mission.  Often reorganizations sent a mixed 
message.  For instance, a medium range radio loop station was installed at Managua 
airport and modified for use of heavy bombardment craft and patrols.  These multiple 
uses suggested a need for coordination and strong unity of command within the Panama 
Sea Frontier.157  However a radio transmission sent instructions removing unity of 
command under 10th Fleet for the Panama Sea Frontier while maintaining it everywhere 
else it had existed, suggesting the Panama Sea Frontier did not require such unity of 
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command.158  The amount of confusion this type of re-shuffling caused left the Command 
vulnerable to massive disorganization and discouraged robust activity.   
At times, the relative lack of activity threatened to make the command forget its 
nature as a military asset.  In May, 1943 Major General Glenn Edgerton, the Governor of 
the Canal Zone, sent a letter to General Brett requesting the relaxation of restrictions on 
travel of dependent family of Canal Zone personnel.  The Governor’s argument centered 
on the acknowledged acceptance that the threat to the Caribbean theater had largely 
dissipated.  As he put it, “The military reasons for the restriction seems to the employees 
to be growing constantly less urgent and they now regard it as a rather arbitrary ruling, 
warranted perhaps, as the time it was imposed but no longer of much practical 
necessity.”159  In fact, the restrictions were part of the military plan and had been enacted 
via official orders so they could not be easily relaxed the way a business would change a 
policy.  The request rather demonstrated an attitude from base personnel that was 
remarkably detached from the usual military way of thinking.  
The acknowledged need for reductions had to be tempered by the necessity to 
continue to operate in the missions that still remained.  To this end General Brett once 
again found himself trying to deal with interagency resource conflicts as he had in the 
Pacific.  Of particular note was a June 15 discussion regarding assigning “Flare Wing 3,” 
a fighter squadron to Panama Sea Frontier instead of having them assigned directly to the 
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Navy’s 10th fleet.160  With the previous reductions in air assets, Brett was anxious this 
unit be assigned directly to the Command due to fear that having them assigned directly 
to 10th Fleet would put them in the direct line of command of the Department of the 
Navy, possibly causing the Command to lose the ability to call on the unit in times of 
need.  No doubt remembering the difficulty he had experienced just the previous year 
securing air transportation from a Navy commander when trying to transport General 
MacArthur to Australia, he was understandably fearful that if this unit were put directly 
under the Navy, the assets could be simply moved away (maybe even capriciously) on 
orders from 10th Fleet without any discussions with Caribbean Defense Command.  
Still, with the knowledge that reductions would continue, the Caribbean Defense 
Command proposed an organizational chart in August 1943 that called for a 40% 
personnel reduction.  Though this organizational chart was never actually approved, it 
became the basis for the headquarters reorganization that would later take place. Aside 
from force reductions, the new plan also called for streamlining special staff.161  Later 
that same month, the War department decided Caribbean Defense Command should 
prepare for further reductions and set the new troop ceiling at 75,000 to be effective July 
1, 1944.162  Since the Antilles Department was at the same time reduced to Defense 
Category “A,” indicating an area of least military concern, the Caribbean Defense 
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Command leadership concluded that the bulk of troop reductions should come from 
there.163   
When the Command had first been set up, its mission had been seen as 
necessitating it be placed under defense category “D,” the highest possible category 
indicating actual or impending hostilities.  The stated reason for this was that there had 
been a real fear of sabotage, revolts, and disorder due to Axis/Japanese presence within 
the AOR at the beginning of the war.164  As these attacks for the most part failed to 
materialize, the Command’s operating defense category had been progressively reduced.  
In a letter dated September 10 from the War Department, Brett was told that it was 
expected that the entire Caribbean Defense Command would undergo the same reduction 
in Defense Category as had been given to the Antilles Department by the middle of the 
following year.  It said in part,  
In connection with the development of overall plans for the progressive reduction 
 of defensive installations, both in the United States and overseas, as the need for 
 such installations decreases, the total garrison strength of the Caribbean Defense 
 Command (exclusive of Air Transport Command activities) on 1 July 1944, will 
 not exceed 75,200.  This strength is predicated on the reduction of the category of 
 defense in your theater to category of defense ‘A’, Modified.165  
By 1943, it was possible to eliminate the long distance striking force of the 
Caribbean Defense Command (meaning parachute troops and airborne infantry), as they 
had never been needed, and with the end of the war clearly in sight and with Axis 
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aggression in the AOR either receding or never having materialized, it did not appear 
they ever would be during the conflict.166  
All this is not to say that the CDC was a failed command, constantly being 
cannibalized and under constant reduction.  The Command did experience several 
successes under General Brett.  Among the various successes that the Caribbean Defense 
Command was undergoing was an increased diplomatic role.  This was due not only to 
the Command’s presence in the region, but also due to General Brett’s own proclivities 
for outreach to the local governments.  Without Brett’s outreach activities one could 
easily see a different pattern having developed where the Command was simply 
downsized into oblivion with little or no chance to demonstrate a value outside of its 
originally stated purpose.  Demonstrating that a joint combatant command could be an 
important player in aiding diplomacy would be one of the CDC’s greatest achievements. 
Ironically, one of Brett’s early attempts at diplomacy almost resulted in 
diplomatic disaster.  A supposed slight almost derailed his relationship with the President 
of Colombia, a nation that would later go on to become an important strategic partner 
despite its strained history with the United States.  In a hand signed letter to 
Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles Dated April 12, 1943 and marked “Personal and 
Confidential,” U. S Ambassador to Colombia Arthur Bliss Lane wrote that he had been 
informed that Brett had acted unprofessionally. The general was reportedly irritated by 
the behavior of Colombian President Alfonso López Pumarejo during his recent visit to 
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Colombia, where Brett allegedly behaved as if Lopez was intentionally slighting him.  
Lane proceeded to state, “that it is most unfortunate that an Army officer in such an 
important post should have such a petty attitude and should not be able to distinguish 
between official and personal matters.”167  The two alleged slights against Brett were that 
President Lopez had not met him at the airport upon his arrival, and had then kept him 
and his party waiting for a previously scheduled meeting.  Although it is impossible to 
know what Brett was thinking at the time, it is easy to surmise that the two incidents had 
been a direct reminder of his treatment at the hands of MacArthur just the previous year, 
and though not hyper-sensitive like MacArthur, it must have been grating to be reminded 
of his humiliation in such a way. 
There is no record of what guidance the embassy received back from the State 
Department.  The matter seemed to have been handled delicately through a letter from the 
U.S. Embassy in Colombia dated April 28.  In the letter (which was not directly written 
by Lane, but claimed to relay a message from him), General Brett was told of possible 
criticism of the United States by Colombian officials who believed the United States had 
shown a preference for Peru in their lend-lease shipments.  This was a believable (and 
possibly true) claim, as inter-American competition for U.S. assistance had already begun 
to rear its head, and Peru and Colombia were often at odds.  Brett was asked simply to 
write a letter to Lopez to thank him and his country both for their warm reception and 
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their cooperation in the war effort.168  Though there is no record of whether or not Brett 
ever learned of Lane’s original complaint, he seemed to have either suppressed the 
incident or chosen to retain only the positive aspects of it as on  April 30 he sent the 
requested letter to Lopez thanking him for his “most courteous hospitality which was 
extended…[during his] most recent visit.”  The letter, written with typical diplomatic 
aplomb goes on to thank Lopez for the cooperation extended by Colombia in meeting the 
defensive requirements set up by the Command.169  Relations seem to have improved 
markedly following this misunderstanding and a mere three weeks after that first 
disastrous meeting, General Brett was communicating with Ambassador Lane about 
positive progress in placing U.S. Personnel in Colombia.170   
Colombia was not the only country where diplomacy was needed.  Since October 
of 1942, the United States had been maintaining bases in the Galapagos Islands via verbal 
agreement with the Ecuadorian government.  U.S. planners strongly desired trying to 
retain these bases after the war, either through a long term agreement or outright 
purchase, making future negotiations likely.171  Unfortunately, the ultimate fate of such 
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bases would be left in the hands of Brett’s successor who would seriously bungle the 
affair (see Chapter 5) and thereby teach the command an entirely different set of lessons. 
Diplomacy had not only been important in securing bases, but also in continuing 
to reduce the Axis threat.  Throughout the war, U.S. planners had worried about the 
relative weaknesses in the region attracting Axis activity.  As the war began to wind 
down, the stability of the Central American and South American governments was still a 
concern, though allied influence had helped.172 As the command was scaled back, it 
became important to maintain the stability that had been achieved, given that there would 
be fewer resources to deal with any new issues which may crop up.  Toward the end of 
the war, most observers agreed that diplomacy more than military power had helped 
reduce Axis threats in the region.173 
Brett used his position to make the Caribbean Defense Command a hub for 
diplomatic activity, flying extensively in the Swoose on his missions.  Not only was it 
used by Brett himself, but it also ferried diplomats and other people of importance around 
the Command.  According to one source, “The flight log of the Swoose records that Brett 
visited Miami; the island nation of Trinidad; Quito, Ecuador; San Juan, Puerto Rico; San 
Jose, Costa Rica; Bogotá, Colombia; Santiago, Chile; and Lima, Peru, between December 
1942 and June 1943.  In July 1943 Brett took famous journalist Lowell Thomas on an 
aerial inspection tour of the Panama Canal fortifications.  According to a former Swoose 
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pilot, Brett’s favorite way to close a visit was with a low, high-speed pass over the 
airfield on departure.”174  Nor was the Swoose Brett’s only tool.  He reportedly also 
commandeered a U.S. rescue boat squadron to host fishing parties, and spent so much 
money entertaining dignitaries that eventually it led to a formal inquiry regarding his 
spending habits.175  For better or worse, Brett set the tone for the type of outgoing 
diplomacy that would need to be undertaken by the command and its successor 
commands in dealing with the region.  His affable, personable way of developing one on 
one relationships with foreign dignitaries is a standard that is followed to this day, and 
which he instinctively understood the need for.  
Racial Issues 
Among the varied developments that the Command experienced during 1943, 
there is one minor one that stands out as an exceptionally disturbing.  Racial issues, 
always a factor in dealing with Latin America, began to be looked at more carefully.  The 
region, particularly the Pacific coast is home to a large Japanese community, and the 
ongoing war with Japan had already been behind one of the most shameful episodes in 
American history, the internment of Japanese citizens in the United States.  In the CDC 
AOR, though not going as far, it was made clear that the number of people of Japanese 
descent was troubling to the Command.  A restricted War Department communication 
dated October 14, 1943 had sought to deal with this issue via establishing clearly defined 
                                                          
174.  Cox, Airpower Leadership, 74. 
175.  Cox, Airpower Leadership, 75. 
114 
 
parameters on how to deal with Japanese in the region.  Although acknowledging the 
need for maximum utilization of all available manpower in the war effort, it said, that 
“No person of Japanese ancestry will be employed in a plant or facility important to the 
war effort,” without approval from either the Japanese-American joint Board or the 
Provost Marshall General.  Likewise, it also said that no person of Japanese descent 
would be “permitted to attend or be employed by an educational institution important to 
the war effort,” without similar approval.176   
The use of Puerto Rican troops also displayed a similar attitude.  Puerto Rican 
troops were increasingly being sought to supplant forces being removed from the 
Command.  This unexpected side effect of the continued force reductions led to some 
discussion that would be termed disturbing in a modern light.  Though exceptional in 
allowing the Command to increase its diversity while giving opportunities to minority 
citizens, the increased use of Puerto Rican troops exposed an attitude toward these troops 
that would rankle modern sensitivities.177   
In March, 1943, the Command’s Deputy Chief of Staff Lieutenant General 
McNarney and General Brett had discussed the possibility of using Puerto Rican troops 
in the command.  A study was commissioned that proved prescient as the War 
Department soon set the 90,000 ceiling with the stipulation that the Caribbean Defense 
Command utilize 30,000 Puerto Ricans.  There were several objections to the use of 
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Puerto Rican troops.  Although all acknowledged that they were U.S. citizens, it was felt 
that they were lacking in “mental, tactical and technical ability” as well as in English 
proficiency.  Despite these concerns, the Antilles department promised that they could 
produce more than the required amount of Puerto Rican troops at an even higher level 
than “continentals.”   
The requirements for the Puerto Rican troops were that they be at least 8th grade 
graduates, speak English, be above the minimum weight and height levels, and receive a 
rating of Class 3 or higher on the Army General Classification Test.178  Additionally, 
official orders for the recruitment of Puerto Ricans requested that all such Puerto Rican 
troops be white. 179  There were stated concerns that the fact that 30,000 of them were to 
be absorbed into the 90,000 troop ceiling meant that one out of three Caribbean Defense 
Command personnel would eventually be one of these Puerto Rican troops.180  Although 
the stated requirements for these troops were mostly a reiteration of basic requirements 
for Army personnel, the stipulation that they be of a specific height seems to have been 
drawn from racial stereotypes regarding the average height of Latin males.  The further 
stipulation that they be white carried no practical advantage and could only be interpreted 
as racially motivated. 
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FIGURE 7: Black troops in the Caribbean region in 1942. 
Source: Pictorial Archives of the United States Southern Command, SOUTHCOM 
Archives.  
Blacks fared no better in the command, though in point of fact, there were black 
troops serving within the CDC, as is evidenced by an internal CDC photograph depicting 
them demonstrating a Jeep being used as a field ambulance somewhere in the Caribbean 
region in 1942 (see Figure 7).  Their assigned duties, however, were very restricted.  A 
1947 memo reiterating racial policy drew a response that there were no “continental 
negroes” in the command, but that many negroes of Puerto Rican or Virgin Island origin 
had been scattered throughout the Antilles Department.  The stated reason was that it 
would be “highly undesirable to utilize continental negro personnel at any place in this 
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command for the reason that Latin negroes and continental negroes will not mix without 
resentment due to racial characteristics which are entirely different and the large 
differential in pay scales between military personnel and native negroes.”181 
Unfortunately, these attitudes continued to be demonstrated in the later evaluation 
of the Puerto Ricans once they had taken their posts.  Final analysis claimed that though 
the first batch of Puerto Rican troops (drawn from pre-existing recruits) was more than 
adequate, the process established for quickly inducting and training additional troops had 
yielded personnel that could not adequately communicate in English and could not be 
assigned to very technical duties such as manning anti-aircraft batteries.  They were, 
however, deemed particularly well suited to guard duty and similar assignments. 182  
Even worse, one report attributed some of their deficiencies as being due to their 
“…being of Latin temperament, [making it] safe to say that most Puerto Ricans are in 
general temperamentally unstable.”183  Nevertheless, by the end of 1943, a great portion 
of the coast artillery in Panama was made up of Puerto Rican troops who served with 
honor and distinction. 
Among the various objections to using Puerto Ricans in the Caribbean Defense 
Command that were sometimes put forth, there was perhaps one legitimate reason for 
doing so for reasons of diplomacy with other Caribbean nations.  In a February 27 
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communication from General Thos Handy to CDC headquarters, Handy acknowledged 
the Caribbean Defense Command’s desire to use Puerto Rican troops in Cuba but 
reiterated that the State Department had emphatically stated that, “the use of Puerto Rican 
troops in Cuba is entirely out of the question.”184  The Cubans, Handy claimed, would 
have objected to such troops being used in their territory pointing to possible racial 
animosities between the peoples of Cuba and Puerto Rico.  Diplomacy demanded that the 
Caribbean Defense Command tread carefully in such matters, and the need to placate 
partner nations restricted opportunities for some troops of Latin descent.   
Overall, 1943 turned out to be an eventful year for the Command.  Starting off 
with a new Commander and a new paradigm, it ended the year following a new course 
and with hints of a new mission.  Though the year started with the Command at its 
strongest, it nevertheless underwent the most dramatic reductions in its brief history and 
was clearly marked as not being as vital to the war as other theaters.  By the end of the 
year, the allies had already established a pattern of continuous bombing of Berlin, and 
had the capability to reach any site in Europe by air.  By this time, about half of Italy had 
already been captured, and the invasion of Normandy was already being planned out to 
take the rest of Europe from the north.  The “Big Three” had met in December for the 
Tehran Conference, and were confident enough in eventual victory to begin envisioning a 
post-war settlement.  Under such circumstances, the threat to the CDC’s AOR must have 
seemed like a secondary consideration at best.  The following year, the Command would 
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continue on its new pattern of reorganization and diplomatic outreach which would 
eventually lead to its transformation into a successor command.  
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CHAPTER 5: 1944-1947, Redefinition and Rapid Downsizing 
Toward the end of 1943, the Command had already begun functioning as a more 
bureaucratic entity than a purely military one.  General Brett’s diplomatic activities 
throughout the region had increased and would continue to do so throughout his tenure 
as Commander.  The Command found itself finally stabilizing after a very rapid growth, 
and finally being able to take a breath now that activities looked like they would be 
winding down.  Though the war had largely not come to the region, the war footing had 
still raised many issues.  The necessity of having a functioning patrol program, 
supplying military personnel, and transporting military equipment presented difficulties.  
A large and active military presence normally takes a toll on a region in both demands 
for resources and strain on utilities.  The need to keep the region alert and prepared, as 
well as the sheer amount of military traffic, however beneficial, was bound to cause 
problems ranging from restrictions on civilian activities to actual accidental damages 
caused by the military presence.   
The latter part of 1943 through 1944 saw an increase in claims against the U.S. 
government from partner nations and private individuals in relation to damages to both 
personal property and strategic assets.  Though these were often little more than 
nuisances to be dealt with, the Command was the main U.S. representative in the region, 
and the need to maintain diplomatic relations with the nations along with its actual legal 
responsibility in dealing with such issues led to an increase in bureaucratic activity in 
handling these claims.   
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The claims, which ranged from mundane issues such as a military truck striking 
and killing someone’s cow, to actual severe damages such as when a U.S. plane crashed 
into a private ranch house effectively destroying it, were usually dealt with in a uniquely 
militaristic way.  Initially, the claimant was required to provide a letter in writing 
detailing the claim.  As the claims were normally in Spanish, it had to then be translated 
by an official translator.  An investigating officer was assigned to the case in order to 
collect information, as well as material evidence of the damages (in the aforementioned 
case even going as far as examining the braking system on the truck and profiling the 
military driver).  Any American serviceman involved in the incident had to be deposed, 
and such deposition had to be presented in writing.  All the information would then be 
examined by a Board of Officers where all aspects of the incident would be analyzed.  
The Board of Officers then created a written review of their findings and 
recommendations, including a determination of damages if any (normally a monetary 
amount for what was considered a fair market value of damaged property).  A check 
would then be issued to the claimant who would sign a form accepting the payment as 
full restitution for their loss and indemnifying the U.S. government for any further 
damages in relation to that incident. 
Such activity, though not extremely out of the purview of normal military 
protocol was nonetheless somewhat unique during a time of war, demonstrating just 
how removed from the actual conflict the CDC AOR had become.185  They would 
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unfortunately also be an early omen of some issues that would come up in the future 
when dealing with the national territories of some of the partner nations in the region.   
Administratively speaking, the structure of the Command had stabilized by this 
point and any changes to the Headquarters or any of its subordinate commands were 
mostly reductions.  From 1944 on there were few changes or additions to the Caribbean 
Sea Frontier for instance, though there were many base closings and de-activations.  Of 
the changes that did happen, most had to do with changes in command, reduction of 
inactivation of activities, and changes in the limits and boundaries.  Issues and 
awkwardness with the French Antilles continued for a while longer, as the islands had 
established a triple détente of sorts between themselves, the Caribbean Defense 
Command, and the government they represented.  The June 6 Normandy invasion 
seemed a precursor to a non-Axis aligned French government for the islands which 
would no longer be a potential threat. 186   
Troop Reductions 
On March 31,1944, preparations were underway to begin eliminating anti-
aircraft defenses in many of the areas where they had been emplaced.  The designation 
of the Defense Category to “A” status late the previous year had meant that reductions 
were imminent.  To this end, it was first necessary to re-define all the existing areas so 
they could be sorted appropriately.    San Juan, Guantanamo, Trinidad, and Aruba-
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Curaçao were designated as “Important Harbors” for the purposes of Anti-Aircraft 
activities and theoretically would not be touched, but all other harbors were open to 
reductions.187  On April 22, the Secretary of the Navy commanded that, routine inshore 
and offshore patrol, mine sweeping and patrol craft escort of shipping in inactive threat 
areas be discontinued except in the case of “important harbors.”188 
On May 13, the Naval Order of Battle at St. Thomas was already in the process 
of being inactivated.  Active Naval Air Station at Jamaica, Roosevelt Roads, and 
Antigua were reduced in classification to Naval Auxiliary Air Fields.  The Naval Air 
Station at St. Lucia was then placed in caretaker status.  On May 16, 1944, all TAG 
(Trinidad, Aruba, Guantanamo) and subsidiary convoys were discontinued, and most 
intelligence and communications were consolidated into the 10th Naval District. On   
May 29, the entire region was re-defined as being a “non-combat area.”  Two days after 
the D-Day invasion of Normandy, (June 8, 1944), Defense Category “A” was lifted 
altogether, and four days later, the 10th Fleet was dissolved.   On June 28, the Chief of 
Naval Operations directed that all lend-lease bases except Trinidad be put on caretaker 
status.   
Overall, the lifting of wartime footing continued throughout the entire AOR for 
the latter half of 1944.189  On August 8, Naval Auxiliary Air Fields in British Guiana 
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were further reduced to caretaker status.  On August 14, the Combat Service Support 
Element requested plans for complete deactivation of defenses and reduction to normal 
status upon cessation of hostilities in Europe from all sectors and activities.  Then, on 
July 25, a Naval Order of Battle Guantanamo dispatch stated that the Naval Auxiliary 
Air Field in Jamaica was to be completely decommissioned on September 1, 1944 and to 
be placed in caretaker status by September 6, 1944.  On August 18, reports stated that 
Vieques (Puerto Rico) inactivation was already in process, and scheduled to be 
completed by September 1, along with Roosevelt Roads.  The Marine Corps Air Station 
at St. Thomas Virgin Islands was inactivated and put on caretaker status, and Blimp 
detachment at Paramaribo was decommissioned by August 13, 1944. 190  Throughout 
these many months, the only exception to this trend in reductions occurred in late 1944, 
when the creation of a Military Missions Division on October 6 actually added more 
personnel.  Otherwise, the prevailing trend was in reduction of forces throughout the 
entire AOR.191  The fact remained, that by VE Day (May 8, 1945), no enemy forces had 
threatened the area at all for over ten months.192 
The most striking thing about these reductions was not that they should be 
undertaken, but the great amount of confidence they betrayed about the successful 
resolution of the war and the United States’ willingness to acknowledge it throughout 
the region.  On November 1, 1944 a training directive for 1945 flat out stated that the 
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“successful” progression of the war (a strange turn of phrase given that the war was still 
ongoing) had allowed a re-focusing with gradual troop reductions the past twelve 
months, though it did warn against complacency and claimed that the Canal Zone was 
still vital to the War plans.  More importantly, the directive added an instruction to assist 
the Latin American republics in modeling their military into well-functioning units 
based on the U.S. model.  It also emphasized the importance of maintaining high 
morale. 193 From VE to VJ Day (September 2, 1945), reductions and deactivations 
continued at an even faster pace.194   
Enemy Submarine Threat 
The submarine threat continued to be a nuisance toward the beginning of the 
year, though it was already highly diminished.195  Some persistent German U-Boats had 
remained in the region while most had left in 1943, but their numbers and tactics were 
very different from those of the first bold attacks on the refinery in 1942.  Throughout 
1944, only two vessels were sunk as a result of enemy submarine action, and it was 
estimated that by this time there were only six subs in the area.  The two sinkings 
occurred early in the year, and even the meager number of remaining enemy submarines 
were reported to have left by July 1944.  The complete removal of the enemy submarine 
threat made little difference when it finally happened as even while still there, 
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observations reported that the subs had begun behaving with remarkable caution 
following 1943.196  This was likely due to the successful American dealings with the 
nations and possessions in the Caribbean, which had effectively denied these subs any 
friendly ports from which to operate.  Commanders of German U-Boats remaining in the 
area by 1944 knew that if they were damaged they would likely have to scuttle their 
vessel (if they even survived) and possibly be taken as war prisoners.  Possibly the 
repercussions of having machine gunned sailors in the water in 1942 weighed heavily in 
their decision making.  It was also possible some of them had remained in the region 
simply for the purpose of avoiding certain death in other theaters of the war.  Whatever 
the case, these remaining subs had not been as bold as their predecessors, and the well 
running anti-sub program being promulgated by the CDC had radically decreased their 
windows of opportunities.  
The success against the U-Boat threat which had been envisioned as being a 
multi-faceted undertaking was eventually dealt with by more patrols and denying enemy 
subs friendly bases to operate out of.  One relative failure in the work of the Command 
was in the use of mine fields which were never particularly effective even when 
deployed.  Port Castries Harbor in St. Lucia had been mined in March 1944, but by that 
time, all the other precautions had already made U-boat activity too costly to enemy 
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subs.197 Minefield operations in general were of doubtful usefulness in the region due to 
the technological issues involved, and all were removed by October 1945.198 
Change of Command 
On October 15, 1945, General Willis D. Crittenberger replaced General George 
Brett as CDC Commander.  Crittenberger, a tank commander, was a rather unusual 
choice for commander of Caribbean Defense Command.  As a lifelong Army officer, 
and a war-fighter at that, he had little experience with collaboration with naval forces 
except perhaps for transportation.  Crittenberger had served as a tank commander of IV 
Corps during the war, and had seen action in Italy.199  One stroke in his favor was that 
his unit was unusual in that it had included not only Americans but also Brazilians and 
South Africans. Still, his appointment seemed to put emphasis on Army presence, and 
de-emphasize the importance of air power in the region.200  General Crittenberger would 
remain as Commander for the remainder of the Caribbean Defense Command’s 
existence and would transition to the role of Commander of U.S. Caribbean Command 
once the Command was reorganized in 1947.   
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Unity of Command 
The issue of unity of command continued to be a major one for the CDC even as 
operations drew down.  Bringing about unity of command among all the disparate 
military forces in the region had been the original reason for the CDC’s existence.  It 
had also been a key component of war planning for the entire region.  Having achieved 
and maintained unity of command (though the degree was debatable) was seen as one of 
the major accomplishments of the Command, as by the end of the war, both military 
planners and CDC leadership were behaving as though unity of command was now a 
given instead of a goal to be reached.  The stability which this concept inspired was 
evident in the Command’s ongoing communications regarding the future of the region. 
In early 1945, a memo from General Brett regarding Command relations for the  
Panama Canal Department during emergency vs peacetime periods praised the unity of 
command that had been achieved and assumed that it would continue in peacetime in 
order to help manage the various supposed installations that he imagined would continue 
to exist in Panama in the future.  He not only praised the Command’s performance 
through December 1944, but also strongly supported the idea of formally maintaining 
unity of command in peacetime as well as wartime.201  This brought with it several 
complications.  Unity of command had been largely achieved by subordinating pre-
existing positions and institutions to the newly created command.  Oftentimes, this had 
led to a disparity in ranks and confusion regarding authorities.  The governor of the 
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Canal Zone, for instance, though still nominally in charge of the entire Canal Zone was 
effectively subverted in his authority by the Commander of the Caribbean Defense 
Command.  This had already been the source of some disagreement between Brett and 
the War Department which had sent him a letter expressing their disagreement with the 
concept of subordinating the Canal Zone governor in this fashion in times of peace.202   
Furthermore, there were several instances where the Commander of the 
Caribbean Defense Command, who was dual hatted as the Commander of Army units in 
the area had authority to act, but not as CDC Commander.  On November 1, 1945, 
correspondence from the War Department to the Commanding General of the Panama 
Canal Department regarding unity of command made clear that the Panama Canal 
Department commander had control of the 15th Naval District, but emphasized that unity 
of command existed by virtue of his being Panama Canal Department Commander, and 
not by virtue of being CDC commander.  Though this may seem like a distinction 
without a difference, it is a very important distinction to military planners.  That it had 
not caused major conflicts was only the case because military planners had made sure to 
make the CDC commander the Commander of the Panama Canal Department 
simultaneously.  Barring any subsequent streamlining of the authorities, it was possible 
that future commanders may not be given the same authority to act as had the wartime 
commanders.  Thus, unity of command was seen as a desirable though complicated 
quality for future planning in the region.  At the very least, it would require the 
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permanent re-definition of the way the Canal Zone and Canal Department were 
organized.  
Difficulties Caused by Base Closings 
The closing of military and naval bases throughout the region had reached a 
fever pitch toward the end of 1944.  This brought controversy, and unfortunately, it 
would become increasingly complicated as larger more important bases throughout the 
region were ordered closed.  The issue of base reductions was complicated by the 
tenuous nature of many of the agreements that had been reached after U.S. entry into 
war.  Upon U.S. entry into the war, many of the countries in the region had been eager 
to get onboard with the war effort and allowed the United States to set up bases within 
their territories.  Though most Latin American republics had remained supportive of the 
United States throughout the war effort, the lack of detailed agreements regarding rights 
to these bases now began to cause complications.   
Perceiving an ascendant and wealthy postwar United States, the Latin American 
nations began to see U.S. military presence within their borders in a different light.  
Several regime changes had taken place throughout the region leaving more populist 
administrations less inclined to favor U.S. presence in power.  The work of the CDC in 
handling such issues would be a precursor to the role that its successor commands and 
future regional combatant commands would play in the postwar world.  In particular, the 
experiences of the CDC were a warning of the dangers involved in dealing with partner 
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nations and with demands from Washington, especially when they may be at cross 
purposes.   
Of particular note was a very badly handled situation involving Ecuador.  
Following a change in the ruling party in Ecuador from the one that had agreed to grant 
the U.S. bases in the Galapagos to a more populist, nationalistic government that did not 
share the same inclinations, the Ecuadorian National Assembly had resolved that their 
national interests required the United States to leave Ecuadorian territory after the 
war.203 On November 20, 1945, the government of Ecuador asked the United States to 
evacuate the base that had been established at Salinas.  Though U.S. planners had no 
objection to evacuating this base, they were eager to acquire a 99 year lease on existing 
bases in the Galapagos Islands which were seen as necessary for the future defense of 
the region.  General Crittenberger rightly assumed that U.S. acquiescence to Ecuadorian 
demands in Salinas would likely play a part in any future lease negotiations and adopted 
a liberal position on the disposition of U.S. equipment there.  With the support of U.S. 
officials, the Caribbean Defense Command declared nearly all U.S. gear at Salinas to be 
“surplus property” which was then transferred to the Ecuadorian armed forces, and the 
base was handed over in a ceremony in early February 1946.  The government of 
Ecuador as well as the Ecuadorian press were impressed with the U.S. handling of the 
                                                          
203.  U.S. BASES AFTER WAR OPPOSED BY ECUADOR, Dec 30, 1944.  New York Times (1923-
Current File) Retrieved from 
http://ezproxy.fiu.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/106929085?accountid=10901. 
132 
 
handover, noting the United States had met and exceeded the terms of the agreements.  
This positively impacted U.S. relations with Ecuador for a time.204   
Problems arose later when trying to negotiate for the Galapagos bases.  Initial 
negotiations in 1944 had centered around the U.S. granting Ecuador several loans for 
improvements.205 The Ecuadorian government had been reluctant to sign long-term 
leases, and had publicly demanded $20 million in exchange for such bases.  Having 
publicly stated their demands, they saw themselves as unable to alter them lest they lose 
face internationally.  U.S. planners on the other hand considered the continued U.S. 
presence as beneficial to Ecuador and felt the bases should simply be seen as Ecuador’s 
contribution to regional defense.  They also rightly feared that the public knowledge of 
having paid such an exorbitant amount set a bad precedent which would see other 
nations following suit increasing the costs to the United States exponentially.  The 
impasse eventually led the Ecuadorian government to simply request that U.S. forces 
leave the islands. 
At this point, the State Department expressed the desire not to act in any way 
that would give the Ecuadorians reason to believe the United States was acting in bad 
faith in handing over the base which they felt may complicate future relations or 
negotiations.  General Crittenberger, however, acting on the fact that there was no 
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formal agreement governing U.S. access to the bases, took the position that he had no 
authority to leave any material behind.  The U.S. military began removing all usable 
equipment, dismantling the base, and even destroying any equipment that could not be 
easily transported back to the Canal Zone.  Some equipment was also dumped into the 
sea.  The reasoning was that if there was the possibility of a hostile power ever taking 
the bases, it was best to leave them inoperable.  As a former tank commander, General 
Crittenberger was well versed in military strategy.  His reasoning in this instance 
followed sound military doctrine, and was actually practiced by the British early in the 
war when they destroyed the French fleet at Mers El Khabr after France’s capitulation to 
Nazi Germany.206  Diplomatically speaking however, this was a disastrous move to both 
the British, whose relationship with France briefly deteriorated, and to the Americans in 
their hopes for further relations with Ecuador.  
Later, when the Ecuadorian government decided to re-open negotiations, the 
CDC ordered the deconstruction of the facilities to stop, and attempted to put the base in 
“presentable” condition for a handover ceremony.  They also stationed a small number 
of technicians to help the Ecuadorians run the base following the handover.  This was 
followed by a series of miscommunications over the state of the base where CDC 
personnel were reluctant to let on that it had been partially dismantled.  Unfortunately 
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the damage was done, and the condition of the base shocked the Ecuadorians once they 
saw it, especially in comparison to the condition of the Salinas base at handover.  
This incident had the ultimate effect of damaging base negotiations and 
tarnishing for the foreseeable future the military to military relationship that had been 
built up between the two countries.  It also amplified any future dissatisfaction with the 
Truman administration’s lack of assistance to Ecuador as being driven by resentment.  
The technicians remaining on the base were a further source of resentment as it seemed 
that aside from wrecking the base, the United States was also refusing to vacate entirely.  
Worsening the problem, when finally removing these technicians, the United States took 
with it several water barges and equipment without which the Ecuadorians were unable 
to maintain the base leading them to eventually close it down for good.  The whole event 
soured diplomatic relations between the two countries for the next decade, and served as 
a warning of the necessity to deal with matters not only through a military mindset, but 
also a diplomatic one. 
Increasing Diplomacy and Evolution into Caribbean Command 
Fortunately, not all relations went as badly as the Galapagos handover.  The 
records of the CDC demonstrate that General Brett’s and later General Crittenberger’s 
time was increasingly dedicated to attending to international conferences and meetings.  
General Brett’s aforementioned gregarious nature had made inroads with much of the 
leadership of the AOR, and though the stern Crittenberger did not share Brett’s jocular 
personality, it had been clear to him from the moment he had been sent that he was not 
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going to be leading a war fighting command.  In fact, he later commented that the major 
mission of the command was to help train the militaries of South America in U.S. style 
of warfighting.207  
At the height of World War II, U.S. military planners had assigned 135,000 
uniformed personnel to duty stations in Latin America and the Caribbean.  
Approximately half of those forces had been under the direct control of the U.S. 
Caribbean Defense Command, and many of the rest were under the command of one of 
its subordinate commands. 208  After May 1945, the CDC became a major training and 
staging command for the retraining and deployment of Army troop units released from 
Europe for combat duty in the Pacific, then in late July 1945, there was one final 
reorganization of the CDC headquarters.209  The Command would continue under this 
new organizational plan until its demise. 
In 1947, U.S. strategists adopted a national security plan that transformed the 
wartime headquarters into the U.S. Caribbean Command.  In addition to defending the 
Panama Canal, it assumed broad responsibilities for inter-American security 
cooperation in Central and South America.210  In September 1947, when the Army Air 
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Forces were separated from the Army, the ground and service organization in the 
Caribbean was renamed the United States Army, Caribbean.211   Communications with 
the War Department reiterated that an Army officer would be in charge of Panama 
Canal Operations and Canal Zone, while the Canal Zone governor would continue to be 
subject to this Army officer.212   
In November of 1947, the Caribbean Defense Command was formally renamed 
the United States Caribbean Command, and was reorganized with new goals and 
responsibilities.213  General Crittenberger remained as Commander of the Caribbean 
Command thereby becoming its first commander.  More important than the simple name 
change to Caribbean Command was the major change in mission set that went along 
with it.  What would eventually become a framework for a post-war hemispheric 
security system had begun to take shape throughout the mid-1940s through the use of 
international cooperation and multinational institutions.  The Pan American Union had 
begun the process of establishing norms in security cooperation which would ultimately 
lead to the Rio Pact of 1947.   This declared a mutual security zone in the region holding 
that an attack by any other member would result in defensive action by all.214  These 
security norms were then continued by the Pan American Union’s successor, the 
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Organization of American States.  The emergence of the Cold War (1947-1991) put the 
United States in a more agreeable mood to continue the existence of a singular 
command to oversee the security of the region.  This command, however, would not be 
dedicated to defending against a possible physical attack, but to fighting growing 
communist influence throughout the region.  This would require not only a military 
presence, but also diplomatic activity, military training, humanitarian assistance and 
disaster relief, and an organized program of military training to bring the armed forces 
of the nations in the region in line with U.S. military norms, and to encourage military to 
military cooperation.  The United States Caribbean Command, or CARIBCOM, is 
considered a direct successor to U.S. Caribbean Defense Command and as such serves 
as a link in an uninterrupted chain tying CDC to the current U.S. Southern Command 
which succeeded it in 1963.  The reorganization however, meant that the history of the 
Caribbean Command started in 1947 leaving the CDC’s history, and more importantly 
many of its vital records, as a separate entity entirely.  The important role that was 
played by CDC in the creation of a series of regionally based combatant commands was 
thus not evident for another generation, though its influence was always present.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
In 1947, when the new national security plan transformed the CDC into the U.S. 
Caribbean Command (CARIBCOM) it gave the command broad responsibilities for 
inter-American security cooperation in Central and South America. During the 1950s, 
through a series of AOR reductions, defense officials removed the Caribbean basin from 
the U.S. Caribbean Command’s area of responsibility.  In the event of a global war with 
the communist powers, they reasoned, U.S. Atlantic Command, based in Norfolk, 
Virginia, needed the Caribbean basin to conduct hemispheric antisubmarine operations.  
By 1960, the U.S. Caribbean Command was not engaged in the Caribbean and thus 
carried a name that incorrectly described its geographic responsibilities in Central and 
South America. The John F. Kennedy administration changed the name to U.S. Southern 
Command on June 6, 1963.215  Thus, current U.S. Southern Command tradition lists 1963 
as the date of its founding.  
During the 1960s, U.S. Southern Command’s primary mission involved defending 
the Panama Canal, contingency planning for Cold War activities, and the administration 
of the U.S. foreign military assistance program in Central and South America.  In 
particular, SOUTHCOM and partner nation personnel undertook civic-action projects to 
accelerate regional development. Yet, following the Vietnam War, the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff recommended disestablishing the command to trim the U.S. military presence 
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abroad.  For political reasons, the command narrowly survived, albeit with even further 
reduced responsibilities and resources.  
In the 1980s, internal conflicts in Central America, and elsewhere rekindled U.S. 
military interest in the region, causing the Ronald W. Reagan administration to revitalize 
SOUTHCOM.  The need to fight against the growing communist threat made Southern 
Command relative again.  After the end of the Cold War, Southern Command, like other 
U.S. military organizations, entered a period of dramatic change.  SOUTHCOM 
eventually embraced counterdrug operations, re-expanded its area of geographic focus to 
once again include the Caribbean, and enhanced its capacity for humanitarian missions.  
Then in 1997, in anticipation of the Panama Canal Zone’s handover to Panama in line 
with the Carter-Torijos treaties, SOUTHCOM moved to Miami, Florida placing it for the 
first time within the continental United States.216  By this time, air travel and 
communications technology had largely negated the need to keep the command in 
Panama to deal with the governments of the region, and Miami had become an important 
international hub and venue which made the move all the more logical.  Few people, 
however, realize that the existence of Southern Command as well as that of all other 
regional combatant commands can be traced directly to the CDC, headquartered in 
Quarry Heights, Panama.  Interestingly after all the contractions and expansions in the 
Caribbean Command’s and later Southern Command’s AOR’s, the present SOUTHCOM 
AOR is back to being largely that which existed for the Caribbean Defense Command 
with the only major difference being the exclusion of Cuba. 
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FIGURE 8: Colombian troops manning a machine gun during Korean conflict. 
Source:  U.S. Southern Command Pictorial History 2010, SOUTHCOM Archives. 
Figure 8 was used in a SOUTHCOM pictorial history prepared in 2010 to 
celebrate the move to its new headquarters in the Doral section of Miami, Florida.  It 
depicts three men in military uniform manning a large machine gun emplacement.  One 
of the soldiers is aiming the rifle while the other two look forward, one with the use of 
binoculars.  It is an American .50-caliber machine gun, and the soldiers are wearing U.S. 
issue steel pot helmets and what appear to be American uniforms.  The soldiers’ 
complexions seem dark, but it is not easily discernable if this is simply because of the 
severe shadow their helmets cast or that they are tanned from being out in the sun while 
on duty.  For all appearances, this could be a depiction of American soldiers at an 
American position.  The picture, however, depicts Colombian soldiers while on duty in 
October 1951 during the Korean War.  The fact that the soldiers are outfitted with U.S. 
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issue kit including uniform and weapons is a testament to the success of U.S. engagement 
with Colombia and by extension, the region.  It was also indicative of one of the major 
reasons this type of engagement was necessary during the Cold War.   
Military relations with the nations in Latin America were not only designed to aid 
the United States in fighting counterinsurgency operations, but also to bring these nations 
closer to the military and later diplomatic orbit of the United States.  In some cases, this 
proved disastrous, as one well known attempt at military training, the School of the 
Americas, produced highly questionable results in training partner nation personnel who 
would later be accused of committing human rights violations, necessitating the complete 
abolishment of the school.  Still, military-to-military relations in the region helped 
facilitate diplomatic relations in other ways.  Freely provided military training would 
potentially lead to sales of military equipment to partner nations.  The sale of military 
equipment would then introduce these nations to an entire ecosystem of U.S. made 
matériel and U.S. training for equipment maintenance and spare parts.  Even if this did 
not lead to active alliances, it would deny the Soviet Union a toehold into increased ties 
with these countries’ militaries. 
More importantly, military-to-military relations would carry with them 
interpersonal relations with personnel from the region.  Much as General Brett 
instinctively understood, personal relations with the region were a necessity which could 
not be ignored.  Additionally, this type of engagement could not be limited to simply 
military relations, but diplomacy would have to be a major part of the work being done.  
As General Crittenberger sadly discovered in the Command’s disastrous handover of the 
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Galapagos bases to Ecuador, dealing with the military in the region could not simply take 
into consideration military doctrine, but also carry a view toward improved relations with 
the region.  CARIBCOM and SOUTHCOM also found more kinetic ways to remain 
engaged with the nations in their AORs.  From 1947-1998 these two commands 
participated in sixty-five Disaster Relief missions responding to hurricanes, earthquakes, 
landslides, flooding events, and volcano eruptions throughout the AOR.217  Disaster relief 
had started as a tertiary mission of these commands but came to be one of the major 
missions, and remains so to the present day.  The diplomatic consequences of being the 
partner of choice or the first source of assistance in the region are self-evident.   
The CDC set the precedent for all these activities, and though existing for a mere 
six years, it left a lasting legacy which can be felt to this day.  By successfully 
maintaining control of U.S. military assets in the region during World War II it 
demonstrated that a joint command, consisting of Army, Army Air Corps, and Navy units 
could indeed work under the right leadership and structure.  By successfully dispelling 
the Axis threat, a venture that required ample assistance from the other nations in the 
region, it demonstrated the United States’ willingness to serve as a partner and thereby 
served as a tool for diplomacy.  As it evolved, it shifted its focus more toward 
humanitarian assistance and military training to help bring the nations of the AOR in line 
with the U.S. military.  By the end, as its military resources waned, but its engagements 
with the region continued, it began to act more as a partner than a simply military 
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organization.  Though lacking any actual State Department contingent like Southern 
Command currently has, the CDC was forced to utilize available resources of the U.S. 
government to try to maintain these partnerships, and toward the end of the war, these 
included activities such as disaster relief and similar non-traditional missions.  The CDC 
never fully achieved embracing a whole of government approach, but in fairness, the 
CDC never had to deal with a competing potential partner to the degree its successors 
would when trying to give the nations of the region an alternative to the growing Soviet 
influence.  However, it is clear that the active open engagement with the region in non-
traditional military activities were a tepid early step toward what would evolve into a 
whole of government approach. 
That the CDC never really achieved all its stated goals was not so much a failure 
by the Command itself, but rather a consequence of the changing facts on the ground.  
That several of the planned bases the Command was charged with building and 
maintaining were scrapped before even being completed meant that it would never be 
able to accomplish its original mission.  The original mission, however, had been 
predicated on responding to events that never occurred, and the fact that the Command 
was able to keep some of these from occurring was another testament to its importance.  
The fact that the Caribbean theater never developed into an active theater of the war 
meant that the CDC would not be needed for the purposes it was originally envisioned.  It 
found other outlets for aiding the war effort, however, and non-kinetic as it may seem, 
denying the enemy safe ports or friendly waters through the use of diplomacy and 
cooperation was an actual accomplishment that yielded very real wartime benefits.  In the 
end, the progress of the war kept the Command from reaching its stated goals, but did not 
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prevent it from demonstrating its usefulness.  The relations with the region that the CDC 
formed later lent themselves to greater military cooperation, which in turn came to be 
part of U.S. policy in waging the Cold War.   
Neither the later developments in the SOUTHCOM AOR, nor the establishment 
of regionally based combatant commands that now encompass the entire world would 
have been possible without the groundwork first set up by the Caribbean Defense 
Command.  The fact that the CDC functioned, survived, carried out most of its mission, 
and was able to evolve into something new, encompassing non-traditional military 
aspects, helped set the stage for the military reforms which established the current 
COCOM system.  Thus, the increased diplomacy which the current COCOM system has 
facilitated were actually a continuation of the work first attempted by the Caribbean 
Defense Command.  It is clear then, that this process did not begin in a vacuum with the 
adoption of the 1947 Unified Command Plan, as Watson has suggested, but rather in 
1941 with the first moves toward the creation of the CDC.  When looking at the history 
of joint combatant commands then, it is necessary to include the history of the Caribbean 
Defense Command at the front. 
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EPILOGUE 
 
Research into the Caribbean Defense Command is far from complete.  Its records 
were eventually packaged and sent to the United States National Archives where they 
were kept until being moved to the new National Archives facility in Suitland, Maryland 
near the campus of the University of Maryland.  They have remained there largely 
undisturbed.  An adequate index does not exist for the entire collection, though one 
section does have a finding aid that is over 300 pages long.  There are several other 
sections of approximately the same size or larger that have not been adequately itemized.  
During the summers of 2008-2012, under the leadership of SOUTHCOM Command 
Historian Dr. Bradley Coleman, several summer interns began the process of digitizing 
parts of these documents for posterity.  Their work has only scratched the surface.  Even 
then, as the knowledge of the CDC’s activities has increased within United States 
Southern Command, much of the importance of the CDC’s work has started to become 
part of SOUTHCOM’s institutional memory. 
Opportunities for future research on this subject abound.  Despite the continued 
efforts of the U.S. Southern Command History Department, Record Group 548 remains 
only lightly touched.  The amount of sheer data that can be found within the boxes of this 
collection is such that Dr. Coleman once jokingly referred to each container as being a 
“dissertation in a box.”218  Hyperbole aside, any sample box from the collection has the 
potential to reveal areas of study that had not even been perceived of before.  As 
                                                          
218.  Bradley Lynn Coleman, Ph.D. Director, John A Adams Center, Virginia Military Institute, in personal 
communication with the author, February 19, 2016. 
146 
 
historians look more into this untapped resource, surely the significance of the CDC will 
be further illuminated.   
There are countless topics which could be further examined.  Each one of the 
CDC’s subordinate commands could have a detailed history written on its own 
administrative and war-fighting struggles.  The history of the relations between the CDC 
and the Panamanian government deserve a far more detailed look than this dissertation 
has been able to include.  Likewise, the relations between the CDC and each one of the 
nations in the region were extremely varied, but all helped to shape the postwar makeup 
of the region, and all deserve their own examination.  The role that minorities played in 
the CDC is another issue that only received a passing mention here and deserves to be 
further examined.  The role of women in the Command is also ripe with opportunities for 
further research.  The CDC’s efforts to handle enemy aliens and possible fifth column or 
insurgent groups could also fill many volumes.  For now, many of these unanswered 
questions as well as countless others one cannot even begin to recognize will remain in 
the purview of future research.  
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